The Genealogy Detectives: A Constitutional Analysis of \u27Familial Searching\u27 by Kaye, David H.
Penn State Law eLibrary
Journal Articles Faculty Works
2013
The Genealogy Detectives: A Constitutional
Analysis of 'Familial Searching'
David H. Kaye
Penn State Law
Follow this and additional works at: http://elibrary.law.psu.edu/fac_works
Part of the Criminal Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Works at Penn State Law eLibrary. It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal
Articles by an authorized administrator of Penn State Law eLibrary. For more information, please contact ram6023@psu.edu.
Recommended Citation
David H. Kaye, The Genealogy Detectives: A Constitutional Analysis of 'Familial Searching', 50 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 109 (2013).
THE GENEALOGY DETECTIVES: A CONSTITUTIONAL
ANALYSIS OF "FAMILIAL SEARCHING"
David H. Kaye*
ABSTRACT
"Familial searching" in law enforcement DNA databases has been pilloried as
a step "towards eugenics and corruption of blood" and "lifelong genetic surveil-
lance" that is "inconsistent with a basic pillar of American political thought."
Courts have yet to address the issue fully, but several commentators contend the
practice is unwise, unjust, or unconstitutional. This Article examines the more
significant constitutional claims. It concludes that although kinship matching
should not be implemented simply because it is technologically seductive, neither
should it be removed from the realm of permissible law enforcement information
gathering on constitutional grounds. In reaching this conclusion, the Article
describes the logic of kinship analysis; clarifies the nature of partial-match
searching; shows how an advanced system of DNA databases could yield addi-
tional, accurate leads in the investigation of both routine and high profile crimes;
and explains why this system, if properly implemented, is compatible with
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INTRODUCTION
DNA databases are a darling of the detective's nursery. They began as a
curiosity thought to be useful for solving only a few types of violent crimes.'
Today, they are dazzling devices for enforcing criminal laws from car theft to
murder.2 Computerized matching of the DNA identification profiles from crime-
scenes and victims 3 to profiles from known individuals has produced hundreds of
thousands of "cold hits."4
But some people are never satisfied. A number of scientists have concluded the
databases could produce many useful investigative leads if a technique known as
1. See COMM. ON DNA TECH. IN FORENSIC SCI., NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, DNA TECHNOLOGY IN FORENSIC
SCIENCE 120 (1992) ("[I]t is clear that crimes of most types will not afford the opportunity to recover relevant
biological evidence that will allow the police to identify an unknown suspect .... ).
2. See Edwin Zedlewski & Mary B. Murphy, DNA Analysis for "Minor" Crimes: A Major Benefit for Law
Enforcement, 2006 NIJ J. 2, 2, 5 (noting expansion of DNA databases to solve property crimes in the United States
and the United Kingdom) (2006).
3. For brevity, this Article uses the phrase "crime-scene DNA" to refer to DNA that appears to have come from
a criminal, whether found in a location associated with the crime or on or within the body or clothing of an
apparent victim.
4. CODIS-NDIS Statistics, FBI, http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/lab/codis/ndis-statistics (last visited Nov. 23,
2012).
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kinship analysis were routinely employed.5 To take their idea to its logical
extreme, we can envision a database system constructed to be especially useful for
this kind of analysis. Like today's databases, this system would pick out any
individuals in the database who are likely sources of crime-scene DNA samples.
But the trawling would not stop there. Almost magically, it could lead to
identifications of individuals outside the database who left their DNA at crime
scenes or on their victims.
Unfortunately, there is a catch. These new leads would point only to very close
relatives who are not themselves subject to inclusion in the federal and state
databases because they have not been convicted of qualifying crimes. Kinship
matching, therefore, has been pilloried as "function creep, '' 6 "mission creep, ' '7 "a
major privacy intrusion in the life of families,"8 "the worst kind of guilt by
association," 9 "genetic surveillance for all,"' 0 and "lifelong genetic surveillance""
that is "inconsistent with a basic pillar of American political thought."' 12 And, as if
5. Frederick R. Bieber et al., Finding Criminals Through DNA of Their Relatives, 312 SCIENCE 1315 (2006).
Dr. Bieber and his colleagues reason as follows:
Consider a hypothetical state in which the "cold-hit" rate-the chance of finding a match between
a crime scene sample and someone in the offender database-is 10%. Suppose that among
criminals who are not (yet) in the database themselves, even 5% of them have a close (parent/child
or sibling) relative who is. From our projections that up to 80% (counting the 10 best leads) of
those 5% could be indirectly identified, it follows that the kinship analyses we describe could
increase a 10% cold-hit rate to 14%-that is, by 40%. There have been 30,000 cold hits in the
United States up to now. Kinship searching has the potential for thousands more.
Id. at 1315-16.
6. Barbara Prainsack, Key Issues in DNA Profiling and Databasing: Implications for Governance, in GENETIC
SUSPECTS: GLOBAL GOVERNANCE OF FORENSIC DNA PROFILING AND DATABASING 15, 28 (Richard Hindmarsh &
Barbara Prainsack eds., 2010).
7. Sonia M. Suter, All in the Family: Privacy and DNA Familial Searching, 23 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 309, 317
(2010).
8. Richard Willing, DNA Database Can Flag Suspects Through Relatives: Critics Fear "Genetic Surveil-
lance" oflnnocent, USA TODAY, Aug. 22, 2006, at 2A (quoting Tania Simoncelli).
9. Id.
10. Jeffrey Rosen, Genetic Surveillance for All, SLATE (Mar. 17, 2009), http://www.slate.com/id/2213958; cf.
Frederick R. Bieber & David Lazer, Guilt by Association: Should the Law Be Able to Use One Person's DNA to
Carry Out Surveillance on Their Family? Not Without a Public Debate Say Frederick Bieber & David Lazer, NEW
SCI., Oct. 23, 2004, at 20 ("[Familial searching] brings with it the indirect lifelong surveillance of citizens simply
because they are related to someone whose DNA profile is on record."); Barbara Goldberg, Virginia May Nab
Serial Rapist Through Blood Relative DNA: Familial DNA Powerful Forensic Tool But Few States Use It Because
of Privacy Concerns, ABC News (Aug. 9, 2010), http://abcfews.go.coinfNews/TheLaw/familial-dna-expose-east-
coast-rapist/story?id= 11334748 (quoting Erin Murphy as saying "It's guilt by association").
11. SHELDON KRIMSKY & TANIA SIMONCELLI, GENETIC JUSTICE: DNA DATA BANKS, CRIMINAL INVESTIGA-
TIONS, AND CIVIL LIBERTIES 175 (2011); Suter, supra note 7, at 311; Ellen Nakashima, From DNA of Family, A Tool
to Make Arrests: Privacy Advocates Say the Emerging Practice Turns Relatives Into Genetic Informants,
WASH. POST, Apr. 21, 2008, at Al (quoting "Tania Simoncelli, science adviser to the American Civil Liberties
Union").
12. KRIMSKY & SIMONCELLI, supra note 11, at 83 (attributing this view to Professor Jeffrey Rosen).
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all that were not enough, it has been tarred as "biological determinism"' 3 and a
step "towards eugenics and corruption of blood."
' 14
Although early commentators perceived no fundamental legal barriers to
kinship matching 15 and most writing continues to focus on policy arguments,
16
some recent commentary displays more sympathy or support for constitutional
objections. 17 The most prominent example is an essay by Professor Erin Murphy
entitled Relative Doubt: Familial Searches of DNA Databases, which contends the
technique is counterproductive for police practice, unfair, unjust, and of doubtful
constitutionality. '8
This Article provides a more complete examination of the two most significant
constitutional issues-the Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee of equal protection
of the laws and the Fourth Amendment's protection against unreasonable searches
13. Erin Murphy, Relative Doubt: Familial Searches of DNA Databases, 109 MICH. L. REV. 291, 304 (2010)
("[Flamilial searches ... embody.., biological determinism.") [hereinafter Murphy, Relative Doubt].
14. Adam Schwartz, Senior Staff Counsel, ACLU of Ill., DNA Familial Testing: Civil Liberties and Civil
Rights Concerns, Address at the Northwestern Law School Center on Wrongful Convictions Symposium on
Familial DNA Searching (Mar. 3, 2011), at 4, http://www.aclu-il.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/03/Speech-DNA-
familial-testing.pdf. The constitutional limitation on "corruption of blood" obviously has no application to
criminal investigative practices. See Henry T. Greely et al., Family Ties: The Use of DNA Offender Databases to
Catch Offenders' Kin, 34 J.L., MED. & ETHICS 248, 257 (2006); David H. Kaye, Associational Privacy, the
Presumption of Innocence, and "Corruption of Blood" as Constitutional Metaphors in the Debate on "Familial
Searching," AMER. CRIM. L. REV. (Nov. 26,2012), http://www.americancriminallawreview.com/Drupal/blogs/blog-
entry/associational-privacy-presumption-innocence-and-"corruption-blood"-constitutiona-m [hereinafter Kaye,
Associational Privacy].
15. Jules Epstein, "Genetic Surveillance "-The Bogeyman Response to Familial DNA Investigations, 2009 U.
ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL'Y 141 (2009); Greely et al., supra note 14. Professor Greely recently testified in support,
"with reservations," of legislation to facilitate familial searching. DNA Technology and Cold Cases: Hearing on
H.R. 3361 Before the H. Subcomm. On Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security of the H. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 112th Cong. 25 (2012) (statement of Henry T. Greely, Professor of Law, Stanford Law School).
16. E.g., KRIMSKY & SIMONCELLI, supra note 11; Jessica D. Gabel, Probable Cause from Probable Bonds: A
Genetic Tattle Tale Based on Familial DNA, 21 HASTINGS WOMEN'S L.J. 3, 57 (2010) (urging "vigilant and
uniform" and "rigorous and practical guidelines" to cope with the "certainty" that kinship analysis in databases
will become widespread); Joyce Kim et al., Policy Implications for Familial Searching, 2 INVESTIGATIVE
GENETICS 22 (2011), available at http://www.investigativegenetics.comcontent/2/l/22; Natalie Ram, The Mis-
match Between Probable Cause and Partial Matching, 118 YALE L.J. POCKET PART 182 (2009); Natalie Ram &
Michael Seringhaus, 0 Brother WhereArt Thou?, SLATE (June 14, 2010), http://www.slate.com/id/2256966.
17. Cf. Linda Bartusiak, Comment, Plea Bargaining for DNA: Implications on the Right to Privacy, 13 U. PA.
J. CONST. L. 1115, 1126-28 (2011) (finding a violation of reasonable expectations of privacy from the
involuntarily obtained DNA sample). But see Brett Mares, Note, A Chip off the Old Block: Familial DNA
Searches and the African American Community, 29 LAW & INEQ. 395, 397 (2011) (concluding "familial DNA
testing is constitutional under the Fourteenth and Fourth Amendments"); Mary McCarthy, Note, Am I My
Brother's Keeper?: Familial DNA Searches in the Twenty-first Century, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 381, 382 (2011)
(summarizing the literature and describing the legal arguments as "weak").
18. Murphy, Relative Doubt, supra note 13. Her arguments are summarized, with apparent approval, in Natalie
Ram, Fortuity and Forensic Familial Identification, 63 STAN. L. REV. 751, 789-94 (2011). Similar concerns can
be found in Suter, supra note 7. The first mention of "ethical and constitutional concerns" may be Michelle
Hibbert, DNA Databanks: Law Enforcement's Greatest Surveillance Tool?, 34 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 767, 786
(1999).
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and seizures.' 9 These constitutional provisions, I maintain, are not show-stoppers.
Kinship matching should not be implemented simply because it is technologically
seductive, but neither should be it be taken off the legislative table on constitu-
tional grounds. To reach this conclusion, Part I describes the logic of kinship
analysis and how it can be applied to state-of-the-art forms of DNA databases that
could yield accurate leads in the investigation of both routine and high profile
crimes. It introduces a few standard terms from genetics, presents more neutral
terminology than the slightly ominous phrase, "familial searching," and explains
how kinship matching differs from the partial matching the FBI allows in the
national database (NDIS) that is part of the Combined Offender DNA Index
System (CODIS). It also discusses the difficulty of measuring the efficacy of
"familial searching."
Parts II through IV analyze the two main constitutional objections to kinship
matching. Part II argues the practice is clearly compatible with the established
understanding of the Equal Protection Clause. Parts III and IV analyze the interests
of all convicted offenders and their families to show why kinship matching in law
enforcement databases can qualify as a reasonable search or seizure under the
Fourth Amendment. Like every other investigative technique, it can adversely
affect very close relatives, but the actual Fourth Amendment interests of the
individuals in the database and their close relatives in keeping the state from
finding investigative leads from crime-scene DNA are weak. The government
interest in efficiently investigating crimes with a thorough and properly imple-
mented system of kinship matching therefore outweighs these interests.
I. FROM KINSHIP ANALYSIS TO KINSHIP MATCHING
Kinship analysis refers to comparing DNA from different individuals to see if
those individuals might be related. It is done frequently in child support20 and
immigration 'cases and in missing persons and human remains investigations.22 It
19. Other constitutional provisions-involving associational privacy, the presumption of innocence, and
corruption of blood-have been invoked, but they are makeweights. David H. Kaye, Drawing Lines: Unrelated
Probable Cause as a Prerequisite to Early DNA Collection, 91 N.C. L. REV. ADDENDUM 1 (2012); Kaye,
Associational Privacy, supra note 14. Consequently, they are not pursued here.
20. See, e.g., 1 GEORGE E. DIX ET AL., McCoRMICK ON EVIDENCE § 211 (Kenneth S. Broun ed., 6th ed. 2006)
[hereinafter McCORMICK] (describing increased reliance on DNA testing in paternity suits); DAVID H. KAYE ETAL.,
THE NEW WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON EVIDENCE: EXPERT EvIDENCE § 14.3.2 (2d ed. 2011) (describing the
application of DNA databases to paternity cases) [hereinafter KAYE ET AL., WIGMORE].
21. The first well-publicized application of forensic DNA typing occurred in a British immigration case. DAVID
H. KAYE, THE DOUBLE HELIX AND THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 55 (2010) [hereinafter KAYE, DOUBLE HELIX].
22. E.g., M. Prinz et al., DNA Commission of the International Society for Forensic Genetics (ISFG):
Recommendations Regarding the Role of Forensic Genetics for Disaster Victim Identification (DVI), I FORENSIC
SCI. INT'L: GENETICS 3 (2007) (recommending further DNA sampling as a method to prepare for identifying
victims of disasters).
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is done in criminal cases when a rape victim has a child or an aborted fetus. 23 It is
one reason to believe U.S. soldiers killed Osama Bin Laden rather than a man who
merely resembled him.24 These applications are uncontroversial.
To appreciate the more controversial use of the procedure in criminal database
trawls, it is important to understand the scientific and statistical principles behind
kinship analysis. These are straightforward, but a few technical details bear heavily
on the procedure's efficacy and invasiveness. This Part, therefore, defines and
briefly describes the types of chromosomes, alleles, and loci used in forensic DNA
identification and how these generate likelihood ratios for specific genetic relation-
ships between individuals that can be used to produce investigative leads.25
Chromosomes. In humans, DNA comes in packages known as chromosomes.
Each cell nucleus normally contains twenty-three pairs of chromosomes.26 In
twenty-two of these pairs, called autosomes, the two chromosomes are about the
same length.27 The twenty-third pair differs between males and females.28 Females
have two copies of the X chromosome, while males have one X and one much
smaller y.
29
Sex cells (eggs and sperm) are exceptional in that they have a reduced number of
chromosomes. 3' Each sex cell contains only one chromosome from each homolo-
gous pair, chosen at random, giving them a total of twenty-three individual
chromosomes. 31 When a sperm and egg cell combine, a new set of twenty-three
pairs is formed.32 The fertilized cell divides, as do its daughter cells, giving rise to
trillions of cells in the offspring.3 3 All the new cells (except for sex cells) have the
same genome of twenty-three homologous chromosomes.34 One member of each
pair has been inherited at random from one parent, and the other member was
23. See KAYE ET AL., WIGMORE, supra note 20, § 14.3.2 (describing cases); Willing, supra note 8 (mentioning
Florida's practice of searching its offender database for profiles indicative of the paternity of children born
following a rape).
24. David H. Kaye, Osama Bin Laden's DNA ? 99.9% Accuracy and 0.1% Nonsense, THE DOUBLE HELIX LAW
BLOG (May 3, 2011, 12:23 PM), http://www.personal.psu.edu/dhk3/blogs/DoubleHelixLaw/; Donald G. McNeil
Jr. & Pam Belluck, Experts Say DNA Match Is Likely a Parent or Child, N.Y. TIMES, May 3, 2011, at F2.
25. The discussion that follows oversimplifies some facts. For more detail and qualifications, see, for example,
FORENSIC DNA EVIDENCE INTERPRETATION (John Buckleton et al. eds., 2005); JOHN M. BUTLER, ADVANCED Topics
IN FORENSIC DNA TYPING: METHODOLOGY (2011); WILLIAM GOODWIN ET AL., AN INTRODUCTION TO FORENSIC
GENETICS (2d ed. 2011); KAYE, DOUBLE HELIX, supra note 21; David H. Kaye & George Sensabaugh, Reference
Guide on DNA Evidence, in NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC
EVIDENCE 129 (3d ed. 2011).
26. Kaye & Sensabaugh, supra note 25, at 137.
27. Id. at 136, 200.






34. Id. at 137-38.
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inherited at random from the other parent.35
Loci and alleles. The DNA in a chromosome can be thought of abstractly as a
string of four letters (chemical "base pairs"), designated A, T, C, and G.36 The
sequence of base pairs in a particular chromosome (number 16, for example) is
mostly the same from one individual to another, but at some locations the
sequences are different.3 7 The sequence at each location, or "locus," is called an
"allele."3 8 The simplest alleles are a substitution, deletion, or insertion of a letter at
a particular lOCUS. 3 9 Such variations in the DNA sequence of the same chromo-
some in different people (or between the paired chromosomes in the same person)
are "single-nucleotide polymorphisms," or SNPs.40 Another kind of polymor-
phism is a variation in the length of a region of DNA that arises from different
numbers of several short, repeated letters.4' For example, one chromosome
number 16 in one individual might have the sequence GATA repeated eight times
at a particular locus. Another chromosome 16 might have ten repeats of GATA.
Short-tandem repeat, or STR loci, thus resemble trains with different numbers of
boxcars. There are other kinds of sequence variations, but STRs currently 'are the
most popular loci for identity and kinship testing, and SNPs are expected to come
into widespread use in the near future.42
A. Kinship Analysis with a Suspect
With these terms defined, we can offer a simplified example of kinship analysis
that will facilitate later discussion. The hypothetical example involves only two
DNA samples and two STR loci, but it illustrates how kinship analysis could
supply relevant information in a criminal investigation. A laboratory extracts from
one sample, recovered in a rape case, the DNA from sperm cells. The laboratory
also extracts DNA from cells obtained by swabbing the inside of Joe Suspect's
cheek pursuant to a court order.43 Analyzing these samples, it finds the DNA
profiles listed in Table 1, which also has figures on the frequencies of the alleles in
the general U.S. Caucasian population:4 4
35. Id.
36. Id. at 136.
37. Id. at 137.
38. Id. at 139.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 139, 141-41.
42. See Manfred Kayser & Peter de Knijff, Improving Human Forensics Through Advances in Genetics,
Genomics and Molecular Biology, 12 NATURE REV. GENETICS 179 (2011) (detailing current methods of DNA
identification and anticipating future developments in the field).
43. Many jurisdictions provide for such orders on a showing of reasonable suspicion rather than the traditional
standard of probable cause required for a search and seizure. Edward J. Imwinkelried & D. H. Kaye, DNA Typing:
Emerging or Neglected Issues, 76 WASH. L. REV. 413,420-22 (2001).
44. John M. Butler et al., Allele Frequencies for 15 Autosomal STR Loci on U.S. Caucasian, African American,
and Hispanic Populations, 48 J. FORENSIC SCI. 1,2 Table 1 (2003); John M. Butler et al., Allele Frequenciesfor 27
2013]
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Table 1. Hypothetical two-locus STR profiles and allele frequencies from a
crime and a suspect. The D16S539 locus is on chromosome 16, and DYS444
is on the Y chromosome. The profile associated with the alleged rapist
consists of eight repeats on one chromosome 16 and ten repeats on his
other chromosome. Because a man has only one Y chromosome (having
inherited it from his father and an X from his mother), there is only
one allele at this locus. The percentages are frequencies for these alleles
in samples of U.S. Caucasians.
Locus
Sample D16S539 DYS444
Crime (sperm cells) 8(2%) 10(6%) 15(1%)
Suspect (Joe) 8 (2%) 12 (33%) 15 (1%)
The DNA testing apparently has absolved Joe because he does not match the
crime sample completely. Joe cannot be the source of the sperm because his allele
12 at the D16S539 locus was not present in the sperm DNA. Suppose, however,
that the victim picked Joe out of a lineup, and the police know that he has a brother,
Jim, who resembles him. Does the near miss in the profiles of the sperm DNA from
the unknown rapist and the cheek DNA from Joe support the surmise that Jim is the
rapist?
Kinship analysis offers an answer. It contrasts the probability Ps of observing
the STR types when Joe and the unknown source of the crime-scene sample are
siblings to the probability Pu of observing these types when they are unrelated.
The ratio of these probabilities, Ps/Pu is called the kinship index (or, in this case,
the siblingship index).45 It is an example of a likelihood ratio. Likelihood ratios
measure the probative value of evidence.46 When the ratio is one, evidence is
equally probable under the two hypotheses and thus has no probative value in
deciding which hypothesis is true.47 The extent to which the ratio exceeds one
indicates how much the evidence supports the first hypothesis over the second.48
For example, a positive result on a rapid test for the flu (known as the QuickVue
Y-STR Loci with U.S. Caucasian, African American, and Hispanic Samples, 156 FORENSIC SCI. INT'L 250, 253
tbl.2 (2006).
45. Jianye Ge et al., Comparisons of Familial DNA Database Searching Strategies, 56 J. FORENSIC SCI. 1448,
1448 (2011).
46. E.g., KAYE ETAL., WIGMORE, supra note 20, at § 14.2.1; McCoRMICK, supra note 20, at § 185. Contrary to
the description in Gabel, supra note 16, at 21, taken from NORAH RUDIN & KEITH INMAN, AN INTRODUCTION TO
FORENSIC DNA ANALYSIS 149 (2d ed. 2002), the likelihood ratio does not give the relative probability of the
hypothesis of relatedness. It gives the relative probability of the observed alleles under different hypotheses.
Naively converting the likelihood ratio into the posterior odds is a form of the transposition fallacy. KAYE ETAL.,
WIGMORE, supra note 20, at § 14.2.1-2.




Influenza A+B Test) on a patient with flu-like symptoms supports a diagnosis of
the disease because the test gives this result more often when the virus is present
than when something else is responsible.49 But the likelihood ratio is only about
nine, indicating that the test, while rapid, is far from definitive.5"
At the autosomal locus D16S539, the likelihood ratio for full siblingship is
6.5."' By itself, the one shared allele proves a little, but not much.52 The matching
Y-STR is more revealing. If Joe and the rapist are full siblings, both inherited their
Y chromosome from the same man, so the probability of the matching DYS444
allele is PS = 100%. On the other hand, if Joe and the rapist are unrelated, then the
probability of a match is roughly the proportion of Caucasian men with Y
chromosomes who have this allele.53 This frequency is Pu = 1%. Thus, the
likelihood ratio at this locus is 100/1 = 100. It is 100 times more probable for the
matching Y-chromosome evidence to arise when Joe and the rapist are full siblings
(or otherwise in the same paternal lineage) than when they are two random men.
Combining the two likelihood ratios gives the figure of 6.5 X 100 = 650. 54 The
near miss in the STRs is 650 times as probable when the two profiles come from
Joe and his (as yet untested) brother Jim than when the profiles come from Joe and
an unrelated man.
This information would be quite useful to a magistrate asked to issue a warrant
requiring the brother, Jim, to provide a DNA sample. Yet, Jim might object to
informing the magistrate of the siblingship index on the ground that the police
effectively searched his DNA when-without a new warrant-they reanalyzed
Joe's profile to see whether the semen might have come from a possible sibling. He
could argue that, up to that point, the police had no reason to suspect him--other
than his being related to their suspect-and that it was unjust to place him under
genetic surveillance because of his involuntary family ties.
However, the Fourth Amendment allows kinship analysis without a warrant. In
49. See Timothy M. Uyeki et al., Low Sensitivity of Rapid Diagnostic Test for Influenza, 48 CLINICAL
INFECTIOuS DISEASES at E89, E90 (2009) (reporting the probability of a positive result when the virus is present is
about 27% compared to a 3% probability of this evidence when something else is responsible).
50. Id.
51. The likelihood ratio is given by the expression (I + 2p)/8p, where p is the frequency of the one shared
allele. Charles H. Brenner, Likelihood Ratios for Sibship and Half-sibship, FORENSIC MATHEMATICS, http://dna-
view.com/sibfmla.htm (last visited Nov. 25, 2012). Here, p = 2%, so the ratio is 104/16 = 6.5.
52. The ratio for half-siblingship is (I + 4p)/8p = 108/16 = 6.75. Id.
53. For refinements, see David Balding, Short Tandem Repeats: Interpretation, in 5 WILEY ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
FORENSIC SCIENCE 2365 (Allan Jamieson & Andre Moenssens eds., 2009); J.S. Buckleton et al., The Interpretation
of Lineage Markers in Forensic DNA Testing, 5 FORENSIC SCI. INT'L: GENETICS 78 (2011).
54. Multiplying the likelihood ratios is appropriate if the alleles on chromosome 16 are uncorrelated with the Y
chromosome haplotype. In a large, randomly mating population, the Y haplotype will propagate over many
generations (or be extinguished if men with that haplotype have no male offspring), whereas children will inherit
one of every pair of autosomal chromosomes at random, and these chromosomes will change as a result of
crossing over (the swapping of parts of the homologous chromosomes during meiosis). Kaye & Sensabaugh,
supra note 25, at 137, 181-82. Over time, this recombination in autosomes will wash out any correlation between
the Y haplotype and the autosomal genotype.
2013]
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this example, the interference with Joe's interests, pursuant to court order, was
fully justified, and Jim has no plausible Fourth Amendment claim to immunity
from adverse inferences that flow from the legitimately acquired sample--even if
it takes a little more investigative effort to draw these inferences. In this context,
there is little reason to distinguish between (1) a court order that requires a suspect
to surrender his DNA to ascertain whether the suspect matches the crime-scene
sample and (2) the same court order issued with the understanding that the police
can consider both whether the suspect's DNA matches and, if it does not, whether a
close relative's DNA is likely to match. Parts IV and V present the more detailed
analysis that underlies these conclusions in the context of a database trawl case.
Before engaging in this analysis, however, we should consider how kinship
analysis with a database works.
B. Kinship Analysis with a Database: The Two Types of Database Trawls
Using the same principles of genetics, kinship searches can be conducted in a
law enforcement database of DNA identification profiles. For brevity, we can call
the convicted offenders, whose numerical profiles are recorded, "database inhabit-
ants."55 A database is essentially an extended version of Table 1. Instead of a single
row for Joe Suspect in our example, the table has rows for the profiles of all the
database inhabitants. Moreover, each row is much longer, being based in the
United States on thirteen autosomal STR loci (no X- or Y-STR loci). 56 Whichever
loci are in the database, the profile of these loci derived from a crime scene can be
compared with all the database profiles to see (1) if a database inhabitant's profile
is a match (the usual "cold hit"), indicating that the crime-scene DNA may have
come from the database inhabitant, or (2) if a database inhabitant's profile is a
close enough partial match to establish that the crime-scene DNA may have come
from a very close relative of the database inhabitant. I shall call searches for
normal cold hits "inner-directed" trawls and searches for hits indicating a close
relationship to someone outside the database "outer-directed" trawls.
55. More than half the states and the federal govemment now take DNA from mere arrestees. Julie Samuels et
al., Collecting DNA from Arrestees: Implementation Lessons, NIJ J., June 2012, http://www.nij.gov/nij/joumals/
270/arrestee-dna.htm. The analysis in this Article would apply to these database inhabitants and their first-degree
relatives as well, taking into account the lesser interest that the govemment has in acquiring DNA from
individuals not convicted of an offense. See infra Part IV.A.3.
Professor Murphy uses the terms "offenders" and "database leads" for "the individuals who, by possessing a
databased profile that partially matches a crime-scene sample, point toward suspects, one of whom may be the
source." Murphy, Relative Doubt, supra note 13, at 298. Suter, supra note 7, at 342, and KRIMSKY & SIMONCELLI,
supra note 11, at 84, prefer the more colorful phrase "genetic informant." Gabel, supra note 16, at 4, uses the term
"genetic snitch." Of course, by the same token, a patient who carries a genetic disease becomes a "genetic
informant" or "genetic snitch" when she visits a physician who diagnoses the disease. See, e.g., Pate v. Threlkel,
661 So. 2d 278, 280 (Fla. 1995) (concluding a physician had a duty to warn relatives that a patient had a hereditary
disease).
56. J. M. Butler & C. R. Hill, Biology and Genetics of New Autosomal STR Loci Useful for Forensic DNA
Analaysis, 24 FORENSIC Sci. REv. 15, 16 (2012).
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For example, if the police trawl for a match to a crime-scene sample and Joe's
profile is flagged as a full match, he becomes a suspect as a result of the
inner-directed trawl. But if neither Joe nor any other database inhabitant matches
in full, kinship ratios for all near-misses can be computed, in the hope of finding a
database inhabitant (like Joe) with an unusually large kinship ratio to the indi-
vidual outside the database who left the crime-scene sample (like Jim). With this
outer-directed trawl, Jim-who was outside the database-might come to be a
suspect.
As we have seen, the likelihood ratio for a particular partial match indicates how
strongly the overlap in the profiles supports the inference of a particular relation-
ship.5 7 Even with the standard thirteen CODIS loci, which are not the best for
kinship analysis, likelihood ratios for parent-child or sibling-sibling relationships
can be quite large. Over ten years ago, the National Commission on the Future of
DNA Evidence provided an example of a siblingship index for these loci of about
one million-"that is, the match probability is a million times as great if the DNAs
came from siblings [than] if they came from unrelated persons." 58 If the samples
had come from a crime scene and a database inhabitant (like Joe), this analysis
would have strongly suggested that the crime-scene profile had come from a full
brother or sister of the database inhabitant (like Jim). 59
Outer-directed trawls popularly are known as "familial searching. '60 Like that
favorite phrase of opponents of estate taxation-"the death tax"6 '-"familial
search" has a noxious connotation. It gives an impression of searching through an
extended family-aunts, uncles, cousins, nephews, and so on. The book Genetic
Justice, for instance, warns that "[a]nyone who has his or her DNA profiled in a
state DNA data bank ... brings his or her entire family under DNA surveil-
lance. ' ' 62 The current reality is somewhat less threatening. Although likelihood
ratios can be produced for any desired relationship, with the limited number of
57. With a reasonable number of loci, the pattern of allele sharing across loci generally makes it easy to
distinguish parent-child from sibling-sibling relationships. A child must possess at least one allele in common
with each parent at every locus, while two full siblings have only a 25% chance of inheriting the same pair of
alleles from their parents and a 50% chance of inheriting one allele in common. The probability of two siblings
having at least one allele in common by descent at n loci in a row is therefore (3/4)". For 10 loci, about I -
(3 /4 )i1 = 94% of siblings will have at least one locus with no shared alleles. The figure will be lower when parents
have alleles in common. For 13 loci, the figure is 98%; for 20 loci, 99.7%. In contrast (barring mutations), no
parent-child pairs will fail to have at least one matching allele at every locus. Finding at least one allele in
common at every locus is thus strong evidence of the parent-child relationship as compared to siblingship.
58. NAT'L COMM'N ON THE FUTURE OF DNA EVIDENCE, THE FUTURE OF FORENSIC DNA TESTING: PREDICTIONS
OF THE RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT WORKING GROUP 25 (2000).
59. The likelihood ratio for the partly matching profiles is essentially zero for a parent-child pair and about
1/500 for half siblings as compared full siblings. Id.
60. E.g., Murphy, Relative Doubt, supra note 13, at 297-98; Suter, supra note 7, at 311.
61. See MICHAEL J. GRAETZ & IAN SHAPIRO, DEATH BY A THOUSAND CUTS: THE FIGHT OVER TAXING INHERITED
WEALTH 4, 14 (2006) (finding the labeling of the estate tax as the "death tax" to be an effective strategy for its
opponents).
62. KRIMSKY & SIMONCELLI, supra note 11, at 88.
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STR loci used for database profiles, they are not large enough to generate useful
leads to most relatives.63 With databases of individuals of unknown pedigrees,
kinship analysis with small numbers of loci generally is only effective for
first-degree (parent-child and full sibling) relationships.
64
With more and better loci, police could zero in on the correct first-degree
database inhabitant, but even then, ascertaining and making use of more attenuated
relationships rarely would be feasible. In a database that includes very specific
lineage haplotypes (the genomes of the Y chromosome and the mitochondria), it
would be possible to pick out a database inhabitant who is distantly related to a
person who deposited DNA while committing a crime. However, these lineage
markers only indicate the existence of a common ancestor at some time in history.
They would not enable police to infer that a crime-scene sample comes from, say, a
second cousin of a database inhabitant as opposed to someone else in a lineage
stretching back an unknown number of generations.65
To avoid the connotation that kinship analysis in databases typically will go
beyond the detection of first-degree relatives, I use the less tendentious terms
"near-miss matching" or "kinship matching" for outer-directed trawls. 6 6 This
terminology also clarifies the FBI's slightly confusing effort to distinguish be-
tween "partial match" searching and "familial searching. 67 One would think that
partial-match searching simply denotes any method of identifying possible sus-
pects in a criminal investigation short of a full match.68 As such, "partial match
searching" encompasses both inner- and outer-directed trawls (see Table 2).
Existing CODIS software allows trawls for "low" or "moderate stringency" partial
63. See Stefan Wilkening et al., STR Markers for Kinship Analysis, 78 HUMAN BIOLOGY 1, 5-7 (2006) (finding
current methods and STR markers in use are suitable only in detetcting very closely related persons).
64. Steven P. Myers et al., Searching for First-degree Familial Relationships in California's Offender DNA
Database: Validation of a Likelihood Ratio-based Approach, 5 FORENSIC SCI. INT'L: GENETICS 493 (2011).
65. If the crime-scene sample was sufficient in quality and quantity, testing to produce high density SNP data
would permit an inference as to the degree of the relationship (within one degree of the true relationship). See
Chad Huff et al., Maximum-likelihood Estimation of Recent Shared Ancestry (ERSA), 21 GENOME RESEARCH 768
(2011) (demonstrating that the ERSA's statistical power approached the maximum theoretical limit imposed by
the fact that distant relatives frequently share no DNA through a common ancestor). But beyond excluding many
of the dataset inhabitant's relatives as a likely source, how useful would it be to learn that the source probably is,
say, a fifth, sixth, or seventh degree relative of the database inhabitant?
66. "Genetic proximity testing" is another phrase used in bioethics literature for outer-directed trawls.
Prainsack, supra note 6, at 28-29.
67. See Familial Searching, FBI, http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/lab/codis/familial-searching (last visited Nov. 26,
2012) (defining that partial matching as "the spontaneous product of a regular database search where a candidate
offender profile is identified as a possible close relative because of a similarity in the number of alleles shared
between the two profiles?).
68. A full match is a match to every allele at every locus in the crime-scene samples, though not necessarily in
the database profiles. Some samples are too degraded to allow successful typing of all 13 core loci adopted for
profiles in the U.S. databases. A seven-locus crime-scene profile, for instance, might produce one or more cold
hits in a database trawl, making those database inhabitants suspects in the case. Frequently Asked Questions
(FAQs) on the CODIS Program and the National DNA Index System, FBI, http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/lab/codis/
codis-and-ndis-fact-sheet (last visited Nov. 26, 2012).
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Table 2. Types of trawls in a DNA database
Inner-directed (focuses on database Outer-directed (focuses on people
inhabitants) outside the database)
Full matching: The database inhabitant's
profile contains every allele detected in
the crime-scene sample. As a result, the
database inhabitant becomes a suspect.
Partial matching: The database Partial, near miss, kinship, genetic
inhabitant's profile contains alleles not proximity, or familial matching: The
detected in the crime-scene sample, but database inhabitant's profile differs
these discrepancies might be due to from the one detected in the
ambiguities in mixed crime-scene crime-scene sample in a way that
samples or differences in the system excludes the inhabitant as a possible
used to profile the crime-scene sample. source but that is much more
Database inhabitants are the only targets probable when a parent, child,
of the trawl, although inner-directed brother, or sister outside the
partial matches could lead investigators database is the source (as compared
who exclude the database inhabitant as to an unrelated individual).
a suspect to consider relatives.
matches to deal with ambiguities resulting from mixed samples, technical prob-
lems, or variations in STR-typing kits from different manufacturers. 69 These
partial matches are still the product of inner-directed trawls designed to pick out
database inhabitants as possible sources. The CODIS partial matches are merely
based on counting alleles without considering their frequencies in the population.
Such matching does not use kinship analysis and is ill-suited for outer-directed
searching for relatives.70 For this latter purpose, kinship analysis is more effective
(although it can be combined with allele counting rules of the kind used in CODIS
partial matching).7 '
C. The Efficacy of Kinship Matching
The distinction between near-miss searching for relatives through kinship
matching, on the one hand, and partial-match searching for database inhabitants,
69. KRIMSKY & SIMONCELLI, supra note 11, at 68.
70. Ge et al., supra note 45, at 1448; Scientific Working Group on DNA Analysis Methods Ad Hoc Committee
on Partial Matches, SWGDAM Recommendations to the FBI Director on the "Interim Plan for the Release of
Information in the Event of a 'Partial Match' at NDIS," Forensic Sci. Commun., Oct. 2009, http://www.fbi.gov/
hq/lab/fsc/current/standard-guidlines/swgdam.html.
71. BUTLER, supra note 25, at 605-06; Ge et al., supra note 45, at 1448; Myers et al., supra note 64, at 499.
This is not to deny that partial-match searching as now practiced can be used, albeit inefficiently, to trawl for
relatives. Many agencies are at sea when it comes to reporting out a reduced stringency search that also strikes an
analyst as probative of kinship. For reviews of current, chaotic practices, see Ram, supra note 18, at 767; Suter,
supra note 7, at 324-25.
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on the other, is important because only the former holds the promise of generally
productive trawls for suspects outside the database.72 As noted in the introduction,
a number of scientists have estimated kinship matching could generate thousands
of useful investigative leads nationally.73 That is a theoretical calculation, how-
ever, and direct data on the effectiveness of near-miss searching for relatives
through kinship matching (outer-directed trawling) are extremely limited.74 Be-
cause the technique is almost never used, proponents and opponents tend to rely on
their choice of anecdotes about its value and accuracy.75 Relative Doubt exempli-
fies this strategy. On the one hand, it acknowledges California's spectacular
success in using kinship matching to locate a man alleged to be the Los Angeles
"Grim Sleeper" murderer.76 On the other hand, Relative Doubt emphasizes "one
revealing fact: [Denver's District Attorney, Mitch Morrissey's] familial searches
did not work. None of the three matches turned out to point toward a relative, much
less the source, of the actual crime-scene sample .... [I]t failed in three separate
cases . . . ."77 However, these searches did not use a matching strategy designed
and optimized to detect kinship. When Morrisey experimented with more appropri-
ate software (known as DNA-VIEW) on Denver's local database, he obtained "the
first [successful hit] ever [in] a deliberate familial search in the United States."78
72. Murphy, Relative Doubt, supra note 13, at 341-42, asserts that law enforcement personnel will engage in
"strategic behavior" to perform inner-directed partial matching to generate leads to relatives; accord Ram, supra
note 18, at 783-84. To prevent this, they would forbid a laboratory from advising police they should consider the
possibility that a particular type of relative from outside the database is the source of a crime-scene sample.
Murphy, Relative Doubt, supra note 13, at 345. Professor Murphy also suggests her proposed policy of silence
about plausible leads is comparable to the policy geneticists doing family studies of disease inheritance follow
when they discover misattributed paternity. The analogy is unpersuasive, since there is no large social cost to
maintaining confidentiality in this research context. In the criminal context, the cost of withholding information
exceeds the cost of investigating a potential suspect when kinship clearly is probable. A better argument against
"accidental" kinship matching would be that, without formal kinship analysis, the suspicions of laboratory
personnel might not be justified.
73. See Bieber et al., supra note 5, at 1316 (noting kinship searching has resulted in 30,000 cold hits with the
potential for thousands more).
74. See Murphy, Relative Doubt, supra note 13, at 347 (suggesting procedures that could produce useful
statistics on efficacy).
75. One incident that has largely escaped notice involved an ad hoc database, that is, a "DNA dragnet" in a
small town in Alberta, Canada. There were no full matches, but two partial matches led police to the son of one of
those men, whose DNA did match and who was convicted in 2005. Douglas Quan, Familial DNA Searches Raise
Tough Ethical Questions, THE STARPHOENX (Sasjatoon, Can.), May 21,2011, available at http://www2.canada.coml
saskatoonstarphoenix/news/national/story.html?id =bf5cbe09-392e-4a76-9bdc-b93 1 a 18a4605&p = 2.
76. A more recent arrest in the Santa Cruz Coffee Shop rape case makes California's hit rate for its approach to
kinship trawling two for thirteen. Stephen Baxter, Rare, Familial DNA Used in Case of Rape and Robbery at
Santa Cruz Coffee Shop, SANTA CRUZ SENTINEL, Mar. 15, 2011, http://www.santacruzsentinel.com/ci_17618326.
77. Murphy, Relative Doubt, supra note 13, at 293.
78. Raphaele Moreau-Horwin, States Using Familial Searches, DNA FORENSIcs LLC (Aug. 24, 2012),
http://www.dnaforensics.com/StatesAndFamilialSearches.aspx. For more details on the case, see Car Vandal
Nabbed Thanks To Brother's DNA, WUSA9 (Nov. 17, 2009), http://www.wusa9.com/news/local/story.aspx?
storyid=93841 (reporting Luis Jaimes-Tinajero's "brother was in the system because of a felony conviction for
auto theft" and the "car was one of many at his Denver apartment complex broken into [that] morning").
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So, is Morrissey's record 0 for 3 or 1 for 1? It is neither. Surely, there were many
cases in which the Denver kinship searches drew blanks or false leads. But the
usual, full-match searches do not always produce cold hits either. The latter hit rate
depends on the fraction of perpetrators of the crimes who are database inhabitants.
The former hit rate is more complicated. It depends on (1) sensitivity-that is, the
probability that the kinship matching algorithm registers a hit when it processes the
DNA profile of a true relative of the source of the crime-scene DNA; and (2)
prevalence-the proportion of relatives of database inhabitants (a) who commit
crimes with recovered DNA traces and (b) who are not themselves database
inhabitants. 79 The sensitivity of various algorithms can be estimated, 80 but the
prevalence is more uncertain. In a 1996 study, nearly half of the jail inmates
surveyed stated they have close family members who have been incarcerated,8 a but
we cannot know how many as yet untested close relatives of those incarcerated
individuals have committed crimes for which DNA evidence is on file. Further-
more, with maturing databases, the chance of a criminal's relative being a database
inhabitant will grow. When large databases have been in existence long enough,
"[a] father's profile could lead to a son's apprehension as the younger man begins a
life of crime."82 Nevertheless, until a state implements and tracks the results of a
well designed form of kinship matching in a large number of cases, the real-life
efficacy of the technique will not be known.83
Neither will its costs. These costs, clearly articulated in Relative Doubt, include
indignities to innocent suspects and concomitant distress to loved ones, diverting
79. Category (b) reflects the fact that if two database inhabitants are close relatives with slightly different
profiles and if one is the source of the crime-scene sample, the latter will emerge as an ordinary cold hit. Kinship
matching will not be needed in this case, and the fact that the individual with the full match has a relative with a
kinship hit will not be of interest. Erin E. Murphy, Familial DNA Searches: The Opposing Viewpoint, 27 CRIM.
JUST. 1, 19, 21 (2012) [hereinafter Murphy, Opposing Viewpoint]. However, this is not to say that all the kin of
database inhabitants who have a "shadow presence" in the database are "law-abiding relatives of offenders" (even
as ascertained by the absence of a criminal conviction). Id. Some will have criminal records for lesser offenses
that do not trigger DNA collection, and others will have completed their sentences.
80. Bieber et al., supra note 5; James M. Curran & John S. Buckleton, Effectiveness of Familial Searches, 48
SCIENCE & JUSTICE 164 (2008); Ge et al., supra note 45; Myers et al., supra note 64; Kristen Lewis O'Connor et
al., Evaluating the Effect of Additional Forensic Loci on Likelihood Ratio Values for Complex Kinship Analysis,
PROCEEDINGS OF THE 21ST INTERNATIONAL SYMPOSIUM ON HUMAN IDENTIFICATION (2010), available at http://
www.promega.com/products/pmgenetic-identity/ishi-conference-proceedings/proceedings-index-home/; Thomas
M. Reid et al., Use of Sibling Pairs to Determine the Familial Searching Efficiency of Forensic Databases, 2
FORENSIC SC. INT'L: GENETICS 340 (2008).
81. Bieber et al., supra note 5, at 1316 ("46% ofjail inmates indicated that they had at least one close relative
who had been incarcerated.").
82. BUTLER, supra note 25, at 608.
83. Various figures have been quoted. The most recent for the United Kingdom-which uses only 10 loci-is
27% as of 2010. Id. at 606-07. See also KRIMSKY & SIMONCELLI, supra note 11, at 81 ("Proponents... in the
United Kingdom boast a 90 percent success rate for those cases where it has been employed."); id. at 175 ("By the
beginning of 2008, the United Kingdom analyzed 148 cases using familial searching techniques; only 15 of them
had been resolved with 9 convictions."); Murphy, Relative Doubt, supra note 13, at 301 n. 49 (quoting statistics
from familial searching in the United Kingdom and New Zealand which resulted in eighteen matches and thirteen
convictions out of seventy searches since 2004).
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police resources to unprofitable leads, and adding more DNA tests to produce
better profiles for outside-the-database searches. Deciding whether the game,
especially with current technology, is worth the candle is beyond the scope of this
article. My primary focus is on the mildly futuristic system of kinship analysis with
profiles constructed to be useful in identifying crime-scene sources outside the
databases-that is, in outer-directed as well as inner-directed trawls. In this
system, there would be more loci in the database. In fact, this enhancement may be
on its way, as seven new autosomal STR loci have been proposed for inclusion in
the CODIS "core loci. ' ' 84 Moreover, loci on the sex chromosomes and mitochon-
dria could be part of the profiles. 85 The additional, digitally searchable data would
allow kinship analysis programs (that analyze the pattern of matching alleles
within partially matching profiles and the population frequencies of these alleles as
in Table 1) to filter out efficiently most database inhabitants who are unrelated to'
the source of the crime-scene DNA.86
This system changes the perspective of current thinking about kinship matching
slightly. Because existing databases are confined to autosomal STRs at only 13
loci, near-miss matches require supplemental testing if the DNA itself is to weed
out false leads. For example, California's restrictive trawling rules require labora-
tory technicians to retain and reanalyze samples in the repositories to verify that
the paternally inherited Y-STRs are the same in the crime-scene and the data-
banked samples of males.87 Recording such data at the outset avoids this extra step
and, with it, the incentive to retain the physical samples that contain a wealth of
personally sensitive information.88 Adding mitochondrial sequence data at the
same time would enhance detection of maternally related sources. And using
carefully chosen SNPs in place of or in addition to existing STRs would improve
the resolution of possible kinship. 89
84. Douglas R. Hares, Addendum to Expanding the CODIS Core Loci in the United States, 6 FORENSIC Sca.
INT'L: GENETICS e135 (2012); Douglas R. Hares, Letter to the Editor, Expanding the CODIS Core Loci in the
United States, 6 FORENSIC ScI. INT'L: GENETICS, at e52 (2012).
85. Mitochondria are organelles outside the nucleus that are maternally inherited. Just as Y-STRs (or other
Y-chromosome loci) help distinguish paternal lineages, mitochondrial DNA is a maternal lineage marker. KAYE,
DOUBLE HELIX, supra note 21.
86. See Greely et al., supra note 14, at 254 (stating with "roughly twenty more markers.., similar to the
thirteen CODIS markers.., there would be. few, if any, spurious matches to waste an investigator's time");
O'Connor et al., supra note 80 (modeling the effect of using 20 and 40 STR loci in outer-directed trawling).
Professor Ram is pessimistic about the current specificity of outer-directed searches. However, she discusses
almost none of the relevant research reported. Ram, supra note 18, at 764-65.
87. Information Bulletin from Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Attorney General, DNA Partial Match (Crime Scene
DNA Profile to Offender) Policy No. 2008-BFS-01 (2008).
88. See David H. Kaye, Behavioral Genetics Research and Criminal DNA Databases, 68 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 259 (2006) (outlining arguments for and against sample retention) [hereinafter Kaye, Behavioral
Genetics]. Professor Murphy maintains, without explanation, that sample retention lacks justification and serves
no purpose. Erin Murphy, Paradigms of Restraint, 57 DUKE L.J. 1321, 1409 (2008).
89. C. Phillips et al., Resolving Relationship Tests That Show Ambiguous STR Results Using Autosomal SNPs
as Supplementary Markers, 2 FORENSIC SCI. INT'L: GENETICS 198 (2008).
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But even if one concludes these enhancements would produce significant
benefits in terms of more accurate leads and reduced supplemental search costs,
the constitutional and other questions of legality and political morality of using
databases to target outside individuals remain to be addressed. I turn now to the
principal constitutional arguments.
II. EQUAL PROTECTION
The Fourteenth Amendment mandates every person receive the equal protection
of the law. Arbitrary classifications, which treat similarly situated people differ-
ently, or differently situated people equally, are impermissible. But almost all laws
rest on imperfect generalizations about people and the problems the laws are
designed to address. Even substantial under- or overinclusiveness in a legislative
classification is ordinarily constitutionally tolerable, and a mere "rational basis" to
draw the line where the legislature chooses will justify the law. Last year, for
example, New York expanded the scope of its DNA database law to encompass
virtually all convicted criminals.90 Arguably, the earlier law was underinclusive; or
perhaps the newer one is overinclusive. But neither possibility makes the legisla-
tion irrational. A line must be drawn somewhere, and legislatures ordinarily have
great latitude in deciding where to draw it and when to move it.
But not always. For example, racial classifications, which have long reflected
animosity toward certain groups, are especially likely to constitute unjustifiable
disparate treatment. Accordingly, laws establishing overt racial classifications, and
laws that are neutral on their face but are "administered ... with an evil eye and an
unequal hand"9' to benefit one race at the expense of another, are constitutionally
suspect. Such state action demands the most compelling justification.
Applying these general principles92 to outer-directed trawling demonstrates that
the procedure satisfies the Equal Protection Clause. As explained below, uniformly
pursuing investigative leads from the genetic data at hand is neither a racial
classification nor an irrational one.
A. Racial Discrimination
DNA databases have a greater effect within some racial groups than others. Both
full-match and near-miss searching affect a higher proportion of racial minorities
(relative to their representation in the general population) simply because these
groups are disproportionately arrested and incarcerated, and hence included in law
90. Press Release, Governor Andrew M. Cuomo, Governor Cuomo Signs Law to Expand New York's DNA
Databank, Mar. 19, 2012, http://www.govemor.ny.gov/press/03192012-Dna-Databank.
91. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 373-74 (1886).
92. The thumbnail sketch here is incomplete. For additional complications, categories, and nuances, see, for
example, Kenji Yoshino, The New Equal Protection, 124 HARV. L. REV. 747 (2011).
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enforcement DNA databases.93 Since 1976, however, it has been clear that a
facially neutral and uniformly applied government policy does not violate equal
protection simply because it has a disparate impact on some racial groups. 94 Thus,
it has been said that as long as all database inhabitants are included in database
trawls, the procedure does not even raise "a colorable constitutional claim.,
95
This conclusion could be too hasty. Suppose a municipality were to establish a
local database by enforcing facially neutral traffic laws only against African-
Americans (and a few white offenders who drive so recklessly that they cannot be
ignored).96 Would not the "racial profiling" in the construction of the database taint
its subsequent use? The formally neutral practice of trawling this database of
traffic-offender DNA profiles is no different from picking jurors at random-a
facially neutral practice-from a pool of eligible jurors selected by jury commis-
sioners paying careful attention to race. That system of jury selection surely
deprives the underrepresented minorities of the equal protection of the law even
though the second stage of the selection process is formally neutral.97 Similarly,
uniformly trawling a database that is itself the product of racially biased enforce-
ment of a generally applicable criminal code does not overcome the argument the
system as a whole is infected with impermissible, disparate treatment.
But are existing DNA databases like the hypothetical one I have described?
"Racial profiling" or other overtly discriminatory practices contribute in some
degree to the skewed demographics of DNA databases (or criminal fingerprint
databases, for that matter), but many other factors are at play. Some laws and law
enforcement tactics (such as targeting high-crime areas for patrols) could produce
disproportionate conviction rates among minorities. 98 Unless the gross overrepre-
sentation of minorities in the convict population can be proved to be the result of
93. D.H. Kaye & Michael E. Smith, DNA Identification Databases: Legality, Legitimacy, and the Case for
Population-Wide Coverage, 2003 Wis. L. REV. 413, 452-53 (2003). Blacks outnumber whites in the prison
population, but the effects of kinship matching will fall on both groups as well as on other racial and ethnic
groups. See TODD D. MINTON, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, JAIL INMATES AT MIDYEAR 2010-STATISTICAL
TABLES, NCJ 233431, at 7 tbl.6 (2011), http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/jiml0st.pdf (reporting that 44%,
38%, and 16% of jail inmates are White, Black, and Hispanic, respectively); HEATHER C. WEST Er AL., BUREAU OF
JUSTICE STATISTICS, PRISONERS IN 2009, NCJ 231675, at 27 app. tbl. 13 (2010), http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/
pdf/p09.pdf (indicating 31%, 36%, and 20% of sentenced prisoners are White, Black, and Hispanic, respectively).
94. E.g., McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987); City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55 (1980); Washington
v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 230 (1976). On the death of the Fourteenth Amendment disproportionate impact theory,
see, for example7 Richard Primus, The Future of Disparate Impact, 108 MICH. L. REV. 1341, 1342 (2010).
95. Murphy, Relative Doubt, supra note 13, at 331 (note omitted); accord, Greely, supra note 14, at 259;
Mares, supra note 17. More recently, however, Professor Murphy has written that kinship matching "is not
even ... nominally race-blind" because calculation of the kinship index depends on "probabilities generated
according to racial and ethnic groupings." Murphy, Opposing Viewpoint, supra note 79, at 22. As long as the
statistical procedure is applied to all racial groups, however, the nominal use of race does not amount to disparate
treatment. See infra this Part.
96. John Eligon, Taking on Police Tactic, Critics Hit Racial Divide, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 23, 2012, at A 1.
97. See, e.g., Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U.S. 625 (1972).
98. Eligon, supra note 96.
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intentional discrimination, the established distinction between disparate treatment
and disparate impact should insulate the state's decision to exploit all the genetic
information in the database from any special scrutiny.
Other discriminatory effects of near-match searching are subject to a similar
analysis. Everything else being equal, near-miss trawls will net more suspects
within groups such as Catholics, Mormons, or Latinos, which tend to have larger
families.99 Uncertainty in the estimates of STR allele frequencies is greater in
some population groups than others. This could concentrate the rate of false
positive conclusions of relatedness in the former groups.' 00 African-Americans
have more genetic diversity than other groups, making kinship matching more
accurate for them. Navajos, having suffered repeated population size reductions,
are less variable genetically; a high kinship index will be more common among
unrelated individuals in this group. 'O' The extent to which the differences in the
genetic histories and structure of various groups will generate substantially higher
rates of false leads in particular populations, especially when a large panel of
STRs, X and Y haplotypes, and SNPs are available, is still unclear.10 2 But even
large differences in the utility of outer-directed trawling by race would not be
subject to strict scrutiny. A different ratio of accurate to inaccurate leads in some
populations or socially identified races is still disparate impact, not disparate
treatment. It would not trigger strict scrutiny. Because both full-match and
near-miss searching can generate valid leads for crimes committed by members of
every racial group, it is rational to use them for all database inhabitants even if the
efficacy and impact will be greater within some groups than others.
B. Arbitrary Discrimination
We have just seen that without a sea change in the law of equal protection,
claims of racial discrimination from outer-directed trawling must be rejected. Is
there any other basis for regarding outer-directed trawling as violative of equal
protection? Professor Murphy proposes "even applying the lowest standard of
review, a court might deem irrational a formal policy that effectively divides the
population into two groups-those related to convicted offenders and those who
are not-and then treats the former population as presumptive suspects in criminal
investigations while exempting the latter population from such suspicion."'
0 3
"[R]elatives of convicted offenders," she argues, are indistinguishable from
99. Daniel J. Grimm, Note, The Demographics of Genetic Surveillance: Familial DNA Testing and the
Hispanic Community, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 1164, 1179 (2007).
100. Rori V. Rohlfs et al., Familial Identification: Population Structure and Relationship Distinguishability, 8
PLoS GENETICS (Feb. 9, 2012).
101. Id. at 8. Population structure also may create more false leads for some groups (such as African-
Americans) than others (such as Navajos). Id.
102. Id. Rohlfs et al. focused on the existing 13 CODIS loci. Using Y-STRs and other haplotypes and SNPs
should greatly reduce the false positive rate in every population.
103. Murphy, Relative Doubt, supra note 13, at 331.
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"relatives of nonoffenders [when it comes to] generating government suspi-
cion."'10 4 Near-miss searches "are, by nature, arbitrary and discriminatory
searches ... in a... fundamental way: they unjustly distinguish between innocent
persons related to convicted offenders and innocent persons unrelated to convicted
offenders.' 10 5 Only a flat ban on outer-directed trawling--or a universal database-
would overcome unjustly burdening those who have "the misfortune of being
related to a convicted offender" but lack "some greater inherent criminality."'
10 6
This is dubious reasoning even as a philosophical or policy argument about
fairness. Perversely, it would allow a rapist who could be found through "the
misfortune of being related to a convicted offender" to escape punishment solely
on the ground that another rapist with the same "inherent criminality" cannot be
found through the same "coincidence of biology."' 10 7 The inability of the state, for
reasons beyond its control, to locate the second rapist confers no moral right on the
first one. By following all reasonably available investigative leads in all cases, the
state treats all persons with equal concern and respect.
The related equal protection claim is at least as implausible as the moral one. It
is clearly rational to use a method that is reasonably calculated to produce
investigative leads when the opportunity presents itself-and not to use it when it
is inapplicable. Doing what can be done with legitimately acquired data to identify
criminal actors is not arbitrary-even if it involves family members.10 8 Doing so
for a broad group as opposed to isolated individuals is also not arbitrary. 0 9 Given
that the rational basis test is "notoriously easy to meet," 1 o outer-directed trawling
is a constitutionally permissible legislative choice."'
To be sure, a population-wide database might be a logically superior legislative
response. 12 But the life of legislation has not been pure logic. Equal protection
104. Id.
105. Id. at 304. The term "innocent" here apparently includes all individuals (whether first-degree relatives or
not) who have committed crimes for which they have not been previously convicted. Id. at 305-06.
106. Id. at 308.
107. Id.
108. The impact on families is discussed infra Part IV.
109. Citing Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721 (1969), Relative Doubt notes "the Court has likewise
invalidated broad, dragnet-style acquisition of physical evidence." Murphy, Relative Doubt, supra note 13, at 332,
332 n. 159. But Davis does not suggest it violates the rational basis test to acquire physical evidence from a large
number of suspects. It holds only that a custodial arrest of any individual requires probable cause under the Fourth
Amendment. See, e.g., Hayes v. Florida, 470 U.S. 811, 815 (1985) (reiterating "the holding in Davis that
transportation to and investigative detention at the station house without probable cause or judicial authorization
together violate the Fourth Amendment"); Cupp v. Murphy, 412 U.S. 291, 294-95 (1973) (explaining the "vice"
in Davis was the detention without probable cause, not the act of fingerprinting). For more details on Davis, see
David H. Kaye, Two Fallacies About DNA Databanksfor Law Enforcement, 67 BROOK. L. REV. 179, 197-98 n.71
(2001) [hereinafter Kaye, Fallacies].
110. Murphy, Relative Doubt, supra note 13, at 331.
111. Moreover, it may not be constitutionally irrational for the legislature to act on the premise that "crime runs
in families" even if this bit of folk wisdom lacks a rigorous empirical foundation.
112. Murphy, Relative Doubt, supra note 13, at 308. For commentary or arguments favoring the most inclusive
DNA databases see, for example, Akil Reed Amar, A Safe Intrusion, AM. LAW., June 11, 2001, at 4; David H. Kaye
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gives governments breathing space. It allows them to move one step at a time-in
the interest of achieving a politically .necessary compromise or for other rea-
sons. 1 13 If the differences in the treatment of different individuals do not violate
fundamental rights, no special showing of legislative necessity is required.
Furthermore, even if a court were to demand a more specific justification for not
carrying a policy to its logical conclusion, such a justification is readily available.
It is hardly irrational to hesitate to embrace universal databanking in light of the
more substantial Fourth Amendment objections to that practice. 1" 4 Reasonable
Doubt itself asserts it is "virtually impossible that a universal database could
withstand constitutional scrutiny."''1 5 If this is so, then legislation implementing
both inner-directed and outer-directed DNA database trawling provides for the
most expansive form of DNA databasing that the constitution allows. To do more
would raise "perplexing questions" ' 1 6 for legislators who share Professor Mur-
phy's opinion. Drawing the line at one end of what is constitutionally allowable or
drawing it to avoid perceived constitutional challenges is not constitutionally
irrational. 117
III. ACQUIRING DNA FOR TRAWLING AS A SEARCH
The most substantial constitutional challenge to outer-directed trawling is that it
transgresses the Fourth Amendment. The Amendment guarantees "[t]he right of
the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures" and specifies that "no Warrant shall issue, but
upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing
the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized., 1 18 Blending these
two clauses together, the Supreme Court has long held warrantless searches are per
et al., Is a DNA Identification Database in Your Future?, 16 CRIM. JUST. 4, 5-9, 19 (2001) [hereinafter Kaye et al.,
Identification Database]; Kaye & Smith, supra note 93; Michael E. Smith, Lets Make the DNA Identification
Database as Inclusive as Possible, 34 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 385 (2006); Paul M. Monteleoni, Note, DNA
Databases, Universality, and the Fourth Amendment, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 247 (2006).
113. E.g., Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483, 489 (1955) ("The legislature may select one phase of
one field and apply a remedy there, neglecting the others," by "addressing itself to the phase of the problem which
seems most acute to the legislative mind."); Semler v. Oregon St. Bd. of Dental Exam'rs, 294 U.S. 608, 610
(1935) ("The State was not bound. . . to strike at all evils at the same time .... ). But see Note, Reforming the
One Step at a Time Justification in Equal Protection Cases, 90 YALE L. J. 1777 (1981) (proposing narrowing the
rationale).
114. Sampling DNA from everyone certainly can be defended as constitutional, but it requires a more radical
argument than those most courts have used to uphold offender and arrestee sampling. See David H. Kaye, A
Fourth Amendment Theory forArrestee DNA and Other Biometric Databases, 15 U. PA. J. CONsT. L. 1097 (2013)
[hereinafter Kaye, Fourth Amendment].
115. Murphy, Relative Doubt, supra note 13, at 329 n.152.
116. Id. at 329.
117. Cf Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 597 (1977) (commenting, in response to a due process challenge to a
law enforcement database of records of drag prescriptions, that "we have frequently recognized that individual
States have broad latitude in experimenting with possible solutions to problems of vital local concern").
118. U.S. CONST. AMEND. IV.
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se unreasonable unless they fall under "a few specially established and well-
delineated exceptions"119 to the warrant. requirement. 120 The exceptions cover
many situations. The Court has countenanced searches incident to an arrest,
12 1
searches of movable vehicles, 122 searches of parolees,' 23 searches undertaken for
reasons other than the discovery of evidence for criminal prosecutions, 24 and
various other searches, 125 notwithstanding the absence of a warrant. Indeed, the
Court even has jettisoned any requirement of individualized suspicion when the
warrantless system for searching (that falls within an exception) is not especially
intrusive and is applied evenhandedly to broadly defined groups. 1
26
Applying this body of law, courts have rebuffed dozens of constitutional
challenges to statutes establishing DNA databases for law enforcement. 127 The
courts uniformly uphold acquisition and indefinite retention of DNA from con-
victed offenders for laboratory analysis, the inclusion of the resulting profiles in
databases, and the periodic trawling and retrawling of the compiled profiles.
128
Two lines of Supreme Court cases have led to these results. One group of opinions
invokes the "special needs" exception to the warrant requirement, which allows
searches or seizures that advance interests beyond those of ordinary law enforce-
ment when the state's interests outweigh those of the individual being searched or
seized. Another set applies an ad hoc "totality of the circumstances" balancing test
the Supreme Court used to justify warrantless searches of parolees' clothing and
residences. 129 Even the completion of an offender's sentence does not seem to shift
119. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443,454-55 (1971) (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347,
357 (1967)); see also City of Ontario v. Quon, 130 S. Ct. 2619, 2630 (2010); Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 338
(2009); Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 109 (2006); Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 390 (1978).
120. See generally THOMAS N. MCINNIS, THE EVOLUTION OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 51-74 (2009). For
discussion in the context of DNA database statutes, see D.H. Kaye, The Constitutionality of DNA Sampling on
Arrest, 10 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. PoL'Y 455, 456 (2001) [hereinafter Kaye, Constitutionality]; Kaye, Fourth
Amendment, supra note 114.
121. Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 819 (1996) (allowing warrantless searches even when the arrest is
pretextual); Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752,768 (1969) (limiting the scope of permissible searches incident to
arrest).
122. E.g., California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 387 (1985) (parked motor home); Carroll v. United States, 267
U.S. 132, 134 (1925) (truck on highway).
123. E.g., Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843, 857 (2006).
124. E.g., United States v. Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. 149, 155 (2004) (border searches); Nat'l Treasury Emps.
Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 664 (1989) (drug testing of U.S. Customs Service employees); Bell v. Wolfish,
441 U.S. 520, 557 (1979) (jail cells).
125. MCINNis, supra note 120, at 75-118.
126. E.g., Illinois v. Lidster, 540 U.S. 419 (2004) (roadblock to question motorists about a hit-and-run
accident).
127. E.g., United States v. Amerson, 483 F.3d 73, 89 (2d Cit. 2007); Jones v. Murray, 962 F.2d 302, 310-11
(4th Cir. 1992); Landry v. Att'y Gen., 709 N.E.2d 1085, 1092 (Mass. 1999).
128. See, e.g., United States v. Mitchell, 652 F.3d 387, 397 (3d Cir. 2011) (en banc) (collecting cases);
Amerson, 483 F.3d at 78 (summarizing case law).
129. Amerson, 483 F.3d at 78; Kaye, Fourth Amendment, supra note 114, at 8; Charles J. Nerko, Note,




the balance for DNA databases. 130
Relative Doubt prominently raises the question of whether performing outer-
directed trawls changes this constitutional calculus. It brands as nonsensical the
established doctrine that allows police to use legitimately acquired information in
later cases and in other ways without a warrant, probable cause, or some form of
judicial scrutiny at the later time. Instead, it asserts that every step in a DNA
database system-taking a sample, analyzing (or reanalyzing) it in the laboratory,
storing the sample in case it is needed in the future, and sweeping through the
database every week to locate possible matches-is a separate "constitutional
moment[]., ' 13t And, it analogizes kinship analysis in a database to the "unofficial"
creation of a separate databank of the DNA samples and profiles from a vast
number of relatives. 32
Although I shall show the novel claims about "constitutional moments 1 33 and
"shadow databases"1 34 are untenable, they contain an important insight. Courts
should not assume that just because acquiring and using a convicted offender's
DNA for inner-directed trawling is permissible, so is acquiring and using it for
outer-directed trawling. If outer-directed trawls are part of the process, then
reassessing the overall balance in light of these additional interests-in a word,
rebalancing-may be required. This Article rebalances. It examines the Fourth
Amendment interests implicated by both types of trawling. Taking the conclusion
that the balance of interests makes inner-directed trawling constitutional-as every
court has said it does-as a given, I ask whether any additional interests implicated
by outer-directed trawling alter the balance. The analysis requires us to define the
interests the Fourth Amendment protects and the extent to which a system of
databases for inner- and outer-directed trawling implicates those specific inter-
130. See Boroian v. Mueller, 616 F.3d 60, 62 (1st Cir. 2010) (holding the incremental burden of DNA sample
retention and trawling after the sentence is completed is so minimal that these actions cannot be considered new
searches); Amerson, 483 E3d at 85. In the Ninth Circuit, a few judges explicitly reserved judgment on the
indefinite retention of samples. See United States v. Pool, 621 F.3d 1213, 1233 (9th Cir. 2010) (concurring opinion
citing earlier concurring opinions), vacated as moot 659 F.3d 761. A majority of the judges in the Third Circuit did
the same. Mitchell, 652 F.3d 387.
131. Murphy, Relative Doubt, supra note 13, at 334.
132. Id. at 337.
133. Litigants recently have contended that every time a database is trawled, a new search, apparently
requiring a new warrant, transpires. Boroian, 616 F.3d at 62; Haskell v. Brown, 677 F. Supp. 2d 1187, 1199 n.10
(N.D. Cal. 2009), aff'd sub nom. Haskell v. Harris, 669 F.3d 1049 (9th Cir. 2012). Boroian and Haskell rejected
this definitional move, but the court in Mitchell, 652 F.3d 387, had a "constitutional moment" when, without any
analysis, it characterized "the processing of the DNA sample and creation of the DNA profile for CODIS" as a
"second 'search."' Id. at 407. The Arizona Supreme Court likewise described the laboratory analysis of a sample
as a "second search [that] is, in effect, the analog to opening [a] steamer trunk [or a] purse... to see what is
inside." Mario W. v. Kaipio, 281 P.3d 476, 481(Ariz. 2012). The container analogy is questioned in David H.
Kaye, On the "Considered Analysis" of DNA Collection Before Conviction, 60 UCLA L. REv. DISCOURSE 104
(2013).
134. Murphy, Relative Doubt, supra note 13, at 338.
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ests-as opposed to mere desires for secrecy. 135 This "rebalancing" analysis
suggests kinship matching is a constitutionally acceptable part of a suitably
designed DNA database system. The net incremental benefits and burdens of
near-miss searching do not greatly change the constitutional calculus already
established for full-match trawling.
To reach this conclusion, I proceed through all the phases of generating
investigative leads to relatives. I begin with a brief description of the much
discussed problem of defining a "search" under the Fourth Amendment since this
bears on the question of what is a "constitutional moment."
A. The Definition of a Search
In the watershed case of Katz v. United States, 136 the Supreme Court famously
adopted a reasonable-expectation-of-privacy standard, rather than a pure owner-
ship or possession of property test, to mark the boundaries of the Fourth
Amendment. 137 For example, without probable cause and a warrant, the police
may not place a hidden microphone and transmitter on a public telephone booth to
eavesdrop on calls made inside the booth, but they may send a business associate
with the same equipment hidden on his person to talk to a suspect. 138 The
difference, according this line of cases, is that one can reasonably expect telephone
booths to be free of electronic eavesdropping devices, but one cannot reasonably
expect that an associate will not be reporting to the authorities. 39 If an individual
has no reasonable expectation that his communications will be unreported or
unmonitored, then the Fourth Amendment, with its preference for warrants, does
not come into play-the police constitutionally can gather information without any
reason to suspect an individual of wrongdoing and without prior judicial approval.
If an individual does have a reasonable expectation, then there is a search, and
further analysis is required to determine whether the search is permissible.
The reasonable-expectation-of-privacy standard is notoriously underdeter-
mined.'4 ° Commentators have proposed alternatives to this "doctrinal black hole"
lying "[alt the heart of search and seizure law," 14 1 and in the past year the Supreme
135. Cf. LEO KATz, WHY THE LAW iS SO PERVERSE 30-31 (2011) (distinguishing between moral claims and
mere desires).
136. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
137. But see Orin S. Kerr, The Fourth Amendment and New Technologies: Constitutional Myths and the Case
for Caution, 102 MICH. L. REV. 801, 816 (2004) (contending "the Katz 'reasonable expectation of privacy'test...
has not substantially changed the basic property-based contours of Fourth Amendment law").
138. See United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745 (1971).
139. White, 401 U.S. at 752.
140. E.g., Tracey Maclin, Katz, Kyllo, and Technology: Virtual Fourth Amendment Protection in the
Twenty-First Century, 72 Miss. L.J. 51, 75 (2002) (discussing "Katz's malleability and emptiness").
141. Jed Rubenfeld, The End of Privacy, 61 STAN. L. REv. 101, 103 (2008) (urging renewed emphasis on the
interest in personal security rather than privacy); see also CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN, PRIVACY AT RISK: THE NEW
GOVERNMENT SURVEILLANCE AND THE FOURTH AMENDMENT (2007) (proposing balancing the perceived intrusive-
ness of every form of government data-gathering against the law enforcement value of the practice).
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Court has spoken of the test as merely an alternative to an earlier and narrower
inquiry into whether the government's information-gathering practice was a
trespass or, perhaps more broadly, an unlicensed physical invasion of a protected
area. This surprising doctrinal shift began in United States v. Jones. 142 There, the
Court unanimously held that around-the-clock tracking of a personal vehicle for
weeks, accomplished by placing a magnetized GPS tracker to the underside of the
car, was a search.1 4 3 But the Court was divided on the appropriate theory for
treating the GPS tracking as a search. A bare majority presented the reasonable-
expectation standard of Katz as supplementing rather than replacing an earlier
definition of a search as a trespass to chattels or land for the purpose of gathering
information.'" For these Justices, a technical trespass (to personal property or to a
home or its curtilage) to acquire information constitutes a search regardless of
whether it infringes a reasonable expectation of privacy. 1
45
In Florida v. Jardines,146 police took a dog trained to alert to drugs onto the
porch of a house to see if drugs were inside. The Court split 5-4 on the outcome
under the Jones trespass test. According to four dissenting Justices, this entry on to
the curtilage of the house was not a trespass at common law-as shown by the
majority's inability to cite a single case to the contrary.' 47 Interestingly, Justice
Scalia's majority opinion studiously avoided the term "trespass." Rather it stated
that under "the traditional property-based understanding of the Fourth Amend-
ment," 148 "the officers' investigation [was a search because it] took place in a
constitutionally protected area [and] was accomplished through an unlicensed
physical intrusion."1 49 Whether this variation in terminology signals a more
complex analysis of property-related interests than a dry inquiry into the elements
of a common law trespass is unclear,' 50 but Jones and Jardines establish that
"trespass" in the sense of a physical invasion can be a search even in the absence of
a reasonable expectation of privacy. Either a Jones-Jardines-type physical intru-
142. 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012).
143. Id. at 949.
144. Id. at 950 ("for most of our history the Fourth Amendment was understood to embody a particular concern
for government trespass upon the areas ... it enumerates. Katz did not repudiate that understanding."); id. at
951 n.5 ("[tirespass ... conjoined with... an attempt to find something or to obtain information" qualifies as a
search); A. E. Dick Howard, Out of Infancy: The Roberts Court at Seven, 98 VA. L. REV. IN BRIEF 76, 86 (2012)
("Scalia, for five justices, rediscovered a long forgotten trespass test in Fourth Amendment law"). But see Orin S.
Kerr, The Curious History of Fourth Amendment Searches, 2013 Su. CT. REV. (forthcoming) (arguing that the
pre-Katz mode of analysis was much richer than an inquiry into the common-law rules of trespass).
145. Id. at 949 (2012) ("our Fourth Amendment jurisprudence was tied to common-law trespass, at least until
the latter half of the 20th century");
146. No. 11-564, 2013 WL 1196577 (U.S. Mar. 26, 2013).
147. Id. at *9 (Alito, J., dissenting).
148. Id. at *6 (Scalia, J.).
149. Id. at *4.
150. In a concurring opinion, three Justices who also joined in the majority opinion seemed to agree that the
majority analysis turned on what the dissent called "a putative rule of trespass law." Id. at *9. They explained that
"under a property rubric" the Court had held that "this activity [was] a trespass." Id. at *7 (Kagan, J., concurring).
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sion or a Katz reasonable expectation suffices to demonstrate that state action is a
search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.
Consequently, we must apply both the physical intrusion and the expectation-of-
privacy standard to the steps in building and operating a DNA database. We begin
with the acquisition of the DNA sample.
B. Physical Extraction of a DNA Sample as a Search
The very act of collecting a sample of DNA from an individual potentially
implicates three interests the Fourth Amendment protects-freedom of movement,
bodily integrity, and informational privacy. The first interest is largely beside the
point when the individual already is legitimately in custody. 151 A statute might
authorize the use of force to hold a person still if the individual resists physi-
cally,' 52 but the principal seizure of the person lies in the detention of the arrested
or convicted individual. 53 This detention is neither more nor less of an infringe-
ment of liberty of motion because the state seeks to obtain a DNA sample during
the period when it has legal custody of the individual. Relatives of database
inhabitants have even less of a claim that acquiring DNA samples infringes the
right to be free from arbitrary arrest, for the relatives are not arrested or detained
prior to the near-miss trawl.
The interest in bodily integrity offers a firmer foundation for deeming the
collection of DNA from individuals in custody a search. The Supreme Court
consistently draws on the notion of bodily integrity in holding that extracting
material from inside the body, either by entering the body154 or compelling the
individual to expel the material,' 55 constitutes a search. As Justice Brennan wrote
in Schmerber v. California, 156 the "cherished value" that makes extraction of blood
for measuring the concentration of alcohol in a driver's blood a search is the
151. See, e.g., United States v. Kelly, 55 F.2d 67, 68 (2d Cir. 1932) (characterizing "[t]he... interference with
the person involved in finger printing" as slight). When the individual is not in custody, this factor has more
bearing on the classification. See Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 618 (1989).
152. See David H. Kaye, Forceful DNA Collection from Recalcitrant Prisoners, DOUBLE HELtX L. (Apr. 17,
2011), http://www.personal.psu.edu/dhk3/blogs/DoubleHelixLaw/2011/04/forceful-dna-collection-from-recal
citrant-prisoners.html.
153. Even if resort to reasonable force is a separate Fourth Amendment seizure, it is a permissible means of
executing a search. E.g., Cupp v. Murphy, 412 U.S. 291, 292 (1973); Carr v. State, 728 N.E.2d 125, 129 (Ind.
2000).
154. The easy case, after Schmerber, is "physical intrusion, penetrating beneath the skin," for the physical
trespass "infringes an expectation of privacy that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable." Skinner, 489
U.S. at 616. The borderline case with respect to what lies inside the body is Cupp, 412 U.S., which applied
Schmerber to scraping away debris beneath the fingernails of an arrestee. Id. at 296.
155. See, e.g., Skinner, 489 U.S. at 616-17 ("Subjecting a person to a breathalyzer test, which generally
requires the production of alveolar or 'deep lung' breath for chemical analysis implicates ... concerns about
bodily integrity and.., should also be deemed a search.") (citations omitted).
156. 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
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"integrity of an individual's person."
57
Because DNA sampling for offender databases involves extracting blood or
scraping the inside of the cheek, the lower courts unanimously have treated it as a
search of the person. t58 This result is correct under the Katz standard used in these
cases as well as under the new-old trespass-like standard of Jones and Jardines. 1
59
The physical extraction of DNA via an unprivileged forcible entry into the body
would have been tortious in 1787, and it is a physical invasion of a highly
protected area.
Finally, the interest in keeping certain kinds of personal information confidential
supports this result. This is so even though the Fourth Amendment does not protect
information as such. Schmerber paid no attention to the value of keeping
blood-alcohol content confidential, and later cases involving chemical and micro-
scopic analyses of personal possessions do not recognize a reasonable expectation
of privacy in the information these laboratory tests reveal.160 Yet, some types of
information about a person are so socially and personally sensitive that this
characteristic of the information militates in favor of treating its acquisition as a
search. Thus, the Court has held that although a subpoena to acquire information is
not itself a search, a subpoena for truly private documents not disclosed to third
parties could infringe a reasonable expectation of privacy under Katz. 16 1 More-
over, in Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives'Association, 162 the Court determined
a program to test the urine of certain employees involved a search under Katz
because of two factors-the manner in which the urine samples were acquired and
the sensitivity of the information that could be derived from the samples.
Specifically, the Court noted the social conventions surrounding the act of
urination and the fact that "chemical analysis of urine, like that of blood, can reveal
a host of private medical facts about an employee, including whether he or she is
epileptic, pregnant, or diabetic." 1
63
No such "host of private medical facts" resides in the particular noncoding STR
157. Id. at 772. Having classified the warrantless extraction of bodily material as a search, the majority
proceeded to deem it reasonable because "[t]he officer in the present case, however, might reasonably have
believed that he was confronted with an emergency . I... Id. at 770.
158. See Friedman v. Boucher, 580 F.3d 847, 852 (9th Cir. 2009) (holding under existing case law "[t]here is
no question that the buccal swab constituted a search under the Fourth Amendment.").
159. No. 11-564, 2013 WL 1196577 (U.S. Mar. 26, 2013).
160. See, e.g., United States v. Edwards, 415 U.S. 800, 803-04 (1974) ("Nor is there any doubt that clothing or
other belongings may be... later subjected to laboratory analysis .... "): cf Nita A. Farahany, Searching Secrets,
160 U. PA. L. REV. 1239, 1282 (2012) ("[S]eclusion is the only recognized privacy interest that these searches [for
biometric data] could implicate. When seclusion is the sole cognizable interest at stake, the physical intrusiveness
of the search governs its reasonableness.").
161. E.g., United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435,442-43 (1976); Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 335-36
(1973).
162. 489 U.S. 602, 616-17 (1989).
163. Id. at 617.
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alleles that comprise the DNA profiles in law enforcement databases. 64 A few
minority opinions and some legal commentary deny this 165 or suggest it is about to
change, 66 but these writings share a common error-treating the easily abused
term "junk DNA" as if it were a unitary biological category. 167 Well established
principles of human genetics and statistics make it unlikely the database records of
identifying STRs will supply information that insurers, employers, or police could
use to make meaningful assessments of present or future health status because of
any biological functions these alleles might perform 168 or because they are
statistically associated with strongly disease-related regulatory or coding sites.' 69
In their potential for revealing "private medical facts," the identification profiles lie
somewhere between taxpayer identification numbers and the common ABO blood
groups. 1
70
164. E.g., United States v. Mitchell, 652 F.3d 387, 408 (3d Cir. 2011) (en banc).
165. Schwartz misrepresents the relevant research in human genetics by asserting that four of the original 13
CODIS loci indicate disease status or predisposition and that the discovery of more population-wide associations
with substantial predictive value is just around the comer. Schwartz, supra note 14, at 2. Among other mistakes,
Schwartz cites John Butler as stating three CODIS STRs are associated with kidney disease, cardiovascular
disease, neural tube defects, Edward's syndrome, and Down's syndrome. Id. at 10 n. 9. Butler actually writes "the
13 CODIS core STR loci ... are not known to have any association with a genetic disease or any other genetic
predisposition. Thus, the information in the database is only useful for human identity testing." JOHN M. BUTLER,
FUNDAMENTALS OF FORENSIC DNA TYPING 279 (2010); see also Frederick R. Bieber, Turning Base Hits into
Earned Runs: Improving the Effectiveness of Forensic DNA Data Bank Programs, 34 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 222,
223-24 (2006) ("These particular STR markers are not known to be associated with predilection to human disease
and therefore the forensic DNA typing results do not predict the present or future health status of the individuals
from whom the samples are collected."); Sara H. Katsanis & Jennifer K. Wagner, Characterization of the
Standard and Recommended CODIS Markers, 41 J. FORENSIC SCI. (forthcoming 2013) (manuscript at 3) (finding
"no evidence that any particular repeat genotypes [among the CODIS loci] are indicative of phenotype").
166. Mitchell, 652 F.3d at 416, 424 (Rendell, J., dissenting); United States v. Kincade, 379 F.3d 813, 849-51
(9th Cir. 2004) (en banc) (Reinhardt, J., dissenting); Gabel, supra note 16, at 46-47; Elizabeth E. Joh, Reclaiming
"Abandoned" DNA: The Fourth Amendment and Genetic Privacy, 100 Nw. U. L. REv. 857, 870 (2006); Ram,
supra note 18, at 759.
167. David H. Kaye, Science Fiction and Shed DNA, 101 Nw. U. L. REv. COLLOQUY 62 (2006); Kaye, Fourth
Amendment, supra note 114, at 1155-56; Jennifer K. Wagner, Out with the "Junk DNA," 41 J. FORENSIC SCI.
(forthcoming 2013). On the meaning of the phrase "junk DNA" and its relationship to privacy concerns, see Brief
of Genetics, Genomics, and Forensic Science Researchers as Amici Curiae in Support of Neither Party, Maryland
v. King, No. 12-207, Dec. 28, 2012.
168. One CODIS STR locus may be a part of the genetic system that regulates the level of expression of an
enzyme, but no consistent and strong associations between the alleles at this locus and disease states have been
observed. Kaye, Fourth Amendment, supra note 114, at 1154.
169. An STR locus situated close to coding or regulatory elements in the genome would tend to be inherited
along with those elements. Kaye, Fallacies, supra note 109. This phenomenon is known as linkage disequilib-
rium. E.g., David E. Reich et al., Linkage Disequilibrium in the Human Genome, 411 NATURE 199 (2001). But it
would take large linkage disequilibrium involving a locus that is, in itself, powerfully predictive of a common
disease to permit meaningful prediction of disease status solely from the pair of CODIS STR alleles at the linked
locus recorded in a database. These conditions are unlikely to be realized. David H. Kaye, Please, Let's Bury the
Junk: The CODIS Loci and the Revelation of Private Information, 102 Nw. U. L. REv. COLLOQUY 70 (2007)
[hereinafter Kaye, Bury the Junk].
170. Kaye, Bury the Junk, supra note 169; David H. Kaye, Mopping Up After Coming Clean About "Junk
DNA ", SOCIAL SCIENCE RESEARCH NETWORK (Nov. 23, 2007), http://ssm.com/abstract= 1032094; Kaye, Fourth
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Of course, the same cannot be said of the DNA samples. '7 As with the urine in
Skinner, the blood sample in Schmerber, or even a bit of spittle,1 72 the DNA
sample carries sensitive information about the individual-and, to a lesser extent,
about the close relatives of this individual.' 73 One can envision DNA genotyping
that differs from the profiling done to establish personal identity in that it reveals
private information about the susceptibility to diseases, carrier status for genetic
disorders, ancestry, 174 and, more tenuously, psychological states or tendencies. 
75
Certain parts of one's genome-those clearly related to otherwise nonobvious
disease states or behavioral characteristics-are as much, if not more, a part of "an
individual's private life" 176 as are the hormones or other chemicals found in one's
urine. Because of this possibility, extracting DNA from individuals in custody to
build a database should be considered a search for Fourth Amendment purposes.
Indeed, it is easy to argue this would be the proper outcome even if the DNA were
Amendment, supra note 114, at 1145-58 (discussing the health-information content of fingerprints and DNA
profiles); Kaye, Fallacies, supra note 109 (arguing the concern about whether DNA sequences are coding is
misdirected). However, there is at least one rather roundabout way in which the identification profiles could reveal
substantial medical information. In the future, when the full genomes of individuals are recorded in clinical
databases of medical records, a police agency possessing the profile and having surreptitious access to the
database could locate the entry for the individual's genome and any associated medical records without anyone's
knowledge. Although the STRs would be useful only for identification, that use could be the key to locating
information in patient records. Furthermore, the patient's records and full genome could lead police to the stored
genomes and records of relatives. Although I cannot think of many scenarios in which police would be motivated
to engage in this computer hacking and medical snooping, there may be some. To that limited extent, the STR loci
fall outside the spectrum indicated above.
Moving outside the zone of medical information, it should be noted that even medically uninformative traits
that are inherited could be used for paternity and some other kinship testing. For example, database custodians
could test whether two individuals in a database could have the relationship of parent and child. Brief of Genetics,
Genomics, and Forensic Science Researchers as Amici Curiae, supra note 167.
171. United States v. Pool, 621 F.3d 1213, 1229 (9th Cir. 2010) (Lucero, J., concurring), vacated as moot 659
F.3d 761 (9th Cir. 2011) (en banc); Kaye, Constitutionality, supra note 120, at 482.
172. See Susan Gaidos, A Spitting Image of Health: How Saliva Can Help Doctors Diagnose Disease, Sci.
NEws, Nov. 19, 2011, at 26, available at http://www.sciencenews.org/view/feature/id/335816/title/ASpitting_
ImageofHealth (describing biomarkers in saliva for "diseases such as breast cancer, type 2 diabetes and
Alzheimer's").
173. The sample also could contain sensitive information about the parents, children or brothers and sisters of
the individual whose DNA is acquired for identification, although the inferences regarding such relatives will be
less clear. For example, Familial Mediterranean fever (FMF) is an autosomal recessive disorder characterized by
recurrent and painful attacks of fever and inflammation in certain tissues. John Hopkins University, Familial
Mediterranean Fever; FMF, in ONLINE MENDELIAN INHERITANCE IN MAN (1996-2011), http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.
gov/omim/249100 (last visited Apr. 22, 2011). It is concentrated in (mostly Sephardic) Jewish, Armenian,
Arabian, and Turkish populations. Some 29 deleterious mutations (alleles) of the MEFV gene are known. Id. If the
DNA sample of a database inhabitant tested positive for one or more of these alleles, it would suggest that one or
both parents also is at least a carrier of the same mutation.
174. See Kaye, Fourth Amendment, supra note 114, at 1155-56.
175. See Kaye, Behavioral Genetics, supra note 88, at 281-82.
176. Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721, 727 (1969) (suggesting diluting the probable-cause requirement for
fingerprinting because the process "involves none of the probing into an individual's private life and thoughts that
marks an interrogation or search").
AMERICAN CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW
collected without any bodily invasion,177 as is technologically possible. 178
IV. THE REASONABLENESS OF INNER-DIRECTED AND OUTER-DIRECTED TRAWLING
Thus far, I have maintained that any extraction of DNA from the body of the
individual in custody should be treated as a search. 1 79 As such, the government
must justify the lack of a warrant and probable cause. As noted at the start of Part
III, courts have upheld acquisition and profiling of samples along with trawling the
resulting databases for inner-directed matches on two alternative theories-direct
totality-of-the-circumstances balancing and the special-needs exception to the
warrant requirement. The former approach repudiates decades of Fourth Amend-
ment doctrine preventing courts from making ad hoc judgments of the reasonable-
ness of dispensing with warrants and probable cause.
Time and again, the Supreme Court has demanded adherence to a framework of
categorical exceptions to the warrant requirement. 180 The special-needs exception,
therefore, is more palatable, but it takes considerable effort to conclude that a
search to gather information with which to link an individual to a crime imple-
ments a government interest distinct from ordinary crime control.' 8' It would be
better to recognize a new exception that permits the government
to acquire, analyze, store, and trawl biometric data without a warrant and
without individualized suspicion when five conditions hold: (1) the person
legitimately is detained (or the data are acquired without confining the
individual); (2) the process of collecting the data is not physically or mentally
invasive; (3) collection proceeds according to rules that prevent arbitrary
selection of individuals; (4) the biometric data are used only to establish or
authenticate the true identity of a given individual or to link individuals to
crime scenes; and (5) the authentication or intelligence-gathering system is
valid, reliable, and effective.' 
82
177. Kaye, Constitutionality, supra note 120, at 480; Kaye & Smith, supra note 93, at 444. But see Justin A.
Alfano, Note, Look What Katz Leaves Out: Why DNA Collection Challenges the Scope of the Fourth Amendment,
33 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1017, 1030-31 (2005).
178. When no bodily invasion occurs-when DNA is shed or deposited naturally, or even acquired by
deceit-courts have not perceived any reasonable expectation of privacy. Williamson v. State, 993 A.2d 626,
635-36 (Md. 2010); State v. Athan, 158 P.3d 27, 33-34 (Wash. 2007); lmwinkelried & Kaye, supra note 43, at
436-37. This creates the possibility that during a legitimate, custodial detention, police could collect DNA
samples by having the arrested suspect spit into a cup, by placing the suspect's thumb on a sticky pad, or some
other sampling procedure that does not require physical entry. Kaye, Fourth Amendment, supra note 114, at
1108-09.
179. Relying entirely on the interest in informational privacy, one might go still further and argue that even if
the government acquires the sample without demanding the individual submit to physical sampling-for
example, by collecting DNA from dental floss left in the trash-the acquisition should be considered a search. See
Joh, supra note 166, at 865-69.
180. See cases cited, supra note 119; Kaye, Fourth Amendment, supra note 114, at 1104-05, 1112, 1121-22.
18 1. See Kaye, Fourth Amendment, supra note 114, at 1114-16, 1130-32.
182. Id. at 1143.
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In these circumstances, the intrusion on liberty and informational privacy interests
is relatively minor, and the balance of interests that underlies the normal demand
for a warrant does not apply. 1
83
For present purposes, however, deciding among these three approaches is not
essential. Totality balancing, special-needs balancing, and the balancing required
to justify a categorical exception applicable to a DNA database all involve the
same weighing of the same interests. 184 This Part demonstrates including the
interests of close kin in the balance does not produce a new outcome.
A. The State's Interests
Governments have three principal interests in expansive DNA databases:
establishing the true identity of known (or suspected) offenders; detecting the
perpetrators of crime for the usual purposes (retribution, deterrence, incapacita-
tion, and rehabilitation); and exonerating falsely convicted individuals. 85 The
second interest is predominant, but the others contribute a bit more to the
government's case. Several comments on these interests are in order.
1. Authentication: True Identity
To begin with, before the 19th century, law (and revenue) officials found it
difficult to know the true identities of everyone with whom they had contact.
Prisoners might escape or use an alias when arrested for other offenses. Conse-
quently, jailers began recording identifying information such as weight, height,
and fingerprints of offenders and arrestees, 86 and courts readily upheld collecting
183. For a defense of this conclusion, see id. at 1143-44.
184. The biometric exception, if accepted, would permit some systems of population-wide DNA identification
profiling. Although Professor Murphy, writes "[it seems virtually impossible that a universal database could
withstand constitutional scrutiny," she adds that "[alt best, such a database might be compiled through a quid pro
quo-in order to get a driver's license, for instance, a person would have to submit a DNA sample, although even
then the suspicionless use of that database for criminal justice purposes might raise constitutional problems."
Murphy, Relative Doubt, supra note 13, at 329 n. 152. Another procedure consistent with the exception would use
medical personnel, not police,
to extract identification profiles as an adjunct to [the existing] public health programs that for many
years have screened [DNA] samples from almost all newborns, to identify infants with treatable
genetic diseases. The identification profiles could be transmitted to a single, secure, national
database .... The [genetic] loci ... would be limited to sequences that have no [implications for]
health or other significant physical or mental traits .... [Furthermore,] [a]ccess to the database
would be [strictly] limited to law enforcement personnel investigating specific crimes in which
DNA trace evidence already has been found. Law enforcement agencies would not need-and
should not be permitted-to handle, much less retain, the samples.
Kaye et al., Identification Database, supra note 112, at 5. Of course, any such system "might raise constitutional
problems." The question is whether these problems make the system irreconcilable with the Fourth Amendment.
185. The databases also could be useful in identifying remains in missing persons cases or mass disasters.
186. For a more complete history, see Kaye, Fourth Amendment, supra note 114, at 1124-25; Wayne A. Logan,
Policing Identity, 92 B.U. L. REV. 1561 (2012)
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biometric data on individuals taken into custody. 187 Although it might seem as if
adding DNA to the repertoire of measurements that establish identity is superflu-
ous, '88 it can be argued "[u]nless the Fourth Amendment creates a constitutional
straightjacket that fits but one biometric identifier, the narrow, 'true identity'
exception should pertain to DNA genotyping as much as it does to fingerprint-
ing."189 Even if this is a sufficient reason to establish an offender DNA database,
however, it does not overcome legitimate interests of offenders or relatives in
being free from trawls for inner- and outer-directed matches. A database can serve
the function of recording true identities without being used for suspicionless
trawling for hits to unsolved crimes. Such trawling is useful for criminal intelli-
gence, not for authentication of identity.' 90
2. Intelligence: Investigative Leads and Exonerations
The dominant reason for law enforcement DNA databases is not to keep track of
true identities, but to provide investigative leads in unsolved criminal cases. It is, in
other words, to make certain biological trace evidence as useful as possible in
crime detection. There is much room for argument about the weight this criminal-
intelligence interest deserves. No satisfactory studies have measured the actual
effectiveness of ordinary trawling and kinship matching.' 9' Anecdotal evidence of
spectacularly successful trawls abounds. The Green River Killer, 192 the Night
Stalker, 193 the Grim Sleeper,194 and many other serial killers and sexual predators
who had eluded detection for decades finally were identified by database trawls.
But ramping up a reliable system for collecting crime-scene evidence and large
187. See Kaye, Constitutionality, supra note 120, at 485-88 (describing these cases and proposing they
establish a "true identity" exception to the warrant and probable-cause requirements); David H. Kaye, The
Judicial Reception of Acquiring Biometric Data on Arrest: Photographing, Sizing, and Fingerprinting Before
1933, Forensic Science, Statistics, and the Law, Dec. 25, 2012, http://for-sci-law-now.blogspot.com/2012/12/the-
judicial-reception-of-acquiring.html. But see Logan, supra note, at 186 (arguing the earlier cases were less
approving of the dissemination of this information).
188. King v. State, 42 A.3d 549, 577 (Md. 2012), cert. granted, Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 594 (2012).
189. Kaye, Constitutionality, supra note 120, at 488-89 (explaining "fingerprints already provide an unequivo-
cal, and in some respects, a better record of personal identity than forensic DNA typing. Monozygotic twins can
be distinguished by their fingerprints, but not by genotypes. In addition, with current technology, fingerprints can
be obtained more easily and more cheaply than DNA profiles. On the other hand, fingerprint patterns cannot be
converted into numerical data that can be searched as efficiently as DNA data. Also, an arrestee might be carrying
false identification, and searching a database of DNA prints of individuals with outstanding warrants might reveal
the arrestee is a fugitive") (citations omitted). See also Mario W. v. Kaipio, 281 P.3d, 476, 483 (Ariz. 2012).
190. Some courts have blurred this distinction. See Kaye, Fourth Amendment, supra note 114, at 1102-03).
191. See supra Part I.C.
192. E.g., ANN RULE, GREEN RIVER, RUNNING RED: THE REAL STORY OF THE GREEN RIVER KILLER-AMERICA'S
DEADLIEST SERIAL MURDERER 360 (2004).
193. Ruben Vives, San Francisco Police Link 'Night Stalker' Richard Ramirez to Girl's 1984 Slaying, L.A.
TIMES, Oct. 23, 2009, http://articles.latimes.com/2009/oct/23/localme-richard-ramirez23.
194. See supra Part I.C.
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databases has been costly, and the net benefits are hard to estimate. "'
Despite this uncertainty, courts have been quick to give great weight to claims of
the crime-fighting power of the databases and slow to examine the specifics of the
databases, such as the length of time during which samples and profiles are
retained. A less credulous (or less restrained) judicial stance could prompt more
narrowly tailored laws. 19 6 Nevertheless, if the impacts of advanced database
systems on deeply rooted Fourth Amendment interests are somewhat modest, the
lack of certainty in the government interests may be tolerable. If there is a plausible
case that expanding the scope of the system will be at least moderately effective,
judgments as to its advisability, with due regard to the wide range of concerns
articulated in the literature, can be left to the legislature.
Along with investigative leads come exclusions of innocent suspects or con-
victs. Relative Doubt asks whether "partial match searches are necessary for
exculpatory purposes to exonerate suspects" and uses the case of Darryl Hunt, who
belatedly was exonerated by a near-miss search, to show they are not.' 97 The issue
for Fourth Amendment reasonableness, however, is not whether all postconviction
DNA exonerations necessitate finding the actual criminal. Plainly, they do not. In
many situations, there is no reasonable way to explain how the crime-scene DNA
195. See, e.g., DISTRICT ATTORNEY OF ORANGE CNTY, CAL., EFFECTIVELY UTILIZING DNA TECHNOLOGY TO
SOLVE CRIME IN ORANGE COUNTY 2009-2010 ANNUAL REPORT, at 17-18 (2010); Kyle I. Jen, Michigan's Forensic
DNA Database, FISCAL FORUM: A LEGISLATIVE BRIEFING 7 (Mar. 2003), http://house.michigan.gov/hfa/PDFs/
dna.pdf; Ray Wickenheiser, The Business Case for Using Forensic DNA Technology To Solve and Prevent Crime,
7 J. BioLAw & Bus. 34, 41 (2004); Experts Call for DNA Restrictions, BBC NEWS UK (Sept. 18, 2007),
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uknews/6999703.stm; Jennifer L. Doleac, The Effects of DNA Databases On Crime,
Dec. 2, 2012 (working paper available at http://www.batten.virginia.edu/sites/default/files/fwpapers/Doleac_
DNADatabases_0.pdf).
196. Judicial review of this sort would be analogous to the "less drastic means" test sometimes applied in First
Amendment litigation. Such judicial analysis is a form of marginal balancing. Note, Less Drastic Means and the
First Amendment, 78 YALE L.J. 464 (1969). That is, rather than ask whether the constitutionally relevant benefits
exceed the costs, a court asks whether the gain in a particular feature of the program (such as retaining profiles
indefinitely) advances the government interests very much. Courts in database cases normally apply a total
balancing test. See, e.g., Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 597 (1977) ("State legislation which has some effect on
individual liberty or privacy may not be held unconstitutional simply because a court finds it unnecessary, in
whole or in part. For we have frequently recognized that individual States have broad latitude in experimenting
with possible solutions to problems of vital local concern.") (footnotes omitted). Although Whalen is a due
process case, the Court's inquiries into reasonableness in Fourth Amendment cases are similarly deferential. See,
e.g., Tracey Maclin, The Central Meaning of the Fourth Amendment, 35 WM. & MARY L. REV. 197, 199-200
(1993) (describing rational basis standard); William J. Stuntz, Implicit Bargains, Government Power, and the
Fourth Amendment, 44 STAN. L. REV. 553, 553-54 (1992) (describing reasonableness standard). Indeed, in City of
Ontario v. Quon, 130 S. Ct. 2619 (2010). the Court "refused to declare that only the 'least intrusive' search
practicable can be reasonable under the Fourth Amendment... because 'judges engaged in post hoc evaluations
of government conduct can almost always imagine some alternative means by which the objectives of the
government might have been accomplished ..... Id. at 2632 (internal citations omitted); see also Colorado v.
Bertine, 479 U.S. 367, 373 (1987) ("The reasonableness of any particular governmental activity does not
necessarily or invariably turn on the existence of alternative 'less intrusive' means.") (quoting Illinois v.
Lafayette, 462 U.S. 640, 647 (1983)).
197. Murphy, Relative Doubt, supra note 13, at 308-09.
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could fail to match if the convicted defendant were guilty. In these instances, a
database trawl is unnecessary for postconviction exoneration. 98
But some cases are more ambiguous. Just as the presence of a defendant's DNA
at a crime-scene does not always mean the defendant is a criminal, the exclusive
presence of someone else's DNA at the crime-scene does not always mean that the
defendant is innocent. In a case of a man "convicted of raping a woman who
reported that two men had raped her, and that she had not had consensual sex in the
relevant period preceding the rape,"'199 the police could have picked up the wrong
man and still found enough other evidence for a conviction. Being innocent, the
man would have been unable to say anything about his alleged coconspirator.
Postconviction testing will exonerate the petitioner "if the results reveal two
separate DNA profiles, neither of which is the petitioner's., 20 0 But what if the
postconviction testing reveals only one profile? 201 The postconviction DNA
testing is consistent with the other evidence of guilt. A database trawl, however,
could lead to the man whose DNA is associated with the rape, and his statements
might lead to the other rapist and ultimately to an exoneration.2 °2
Although we cannot know how often either inner- or outer-directed trawling
will exonerate falsely convicted men and women-or prevent future false convic-
tions-the opportunities an advanced database system affords must count at least
slightly in the government's favor. In addition, trawls that lead to the correct
suspect early in the investigation avoid blind alleys and unnecessary and disturb-
ing investigations of innocent persons. Relative Doubt emphasizes the converse
possibility-that the police will waste their resources investigating falsely identi-
fied relatives and cause irreparable injury to the lives of these individuals and their
families. 20 3 If investigations are conducted discreetly, however, and if most leads
from an advanced database are correct, then the benefits of outer-directed trawling
in saving the innocent from becoming suspects may outweigh these costs.
20 4
3. The Reduced Expectation of Privacy
My enumeration of the state's interests pretermitted one of the most prominent
considerations in most opinions upholding the acquisition and inner-directed use
198. E.g., Dist. Attorney's Office for Third Judicial Dist. v. Osborne, 557 U.S. 52, 58 (2009) (noting police
failed to use a definitive DNA test on a condom found with the rape victim's clothing in an isolated location
described by the victim).
199. Margaret Berger, Lessons From DNA: Restriking the Balance Between Finality and Justice, in DNA AND
THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYsTEM: THE TECHNOLOGY OF JUSTICE 109, 116 (David Lazer ed., 2004).
200. Id.
201. Or, it might indicate a mixture in which the major contributor's profile is clear but only one or two loci in
the minor contributor's DNA can be typed. Such a limited partial profile could be shared by many innocent men,
including the petitioner. See id. at 116-17.
202. See id. at 116-19.
203. See Murphy, Relative Doubt, supra note 13, at 308, 317-18.
204. But see id. at 313-14.
[Vol. 50:109
THE GENEALOGY DETECTIVES
of DNA databases against Fourth Amendment challenges-the tarnished status of
the person imprisoned or on supervised release. According to Relative Doubt,
"[t]he rationale justifying such warrantless, suspicionless searches in the case of a
direct match-namely, the diminished expectation of privacy and recidivist threat
of convicted offenders-is absent when it comes to relatives, who retain the full
force of Fourth Amendment protection. 2 °5
It is true that various opinions cite recidivism statistics in describing the strength
of the government's crime-fighting interest.206 But the governmental interest
surely is not limited to determining the identities of offenders who are known to
have committed past crimes. Database trawls that net first-time offenders or
recidivists who previously have escaped detection advance the same interests as
trawls that land criminals with an established history of antisocial acts.2 °7 There is
no static, precisely defined, criminally active segment of the population. People
flow into and out of this category. The more inclusive the database, the more
powerful it is as a tool for apprehending the guilty and deterring some potential
offenders. To be sure, the probability that a given person will commit or has
committed an offense for which a DNA trace might be found is not uniform across
the population, and the state's interest is correspondingly greater for some groups
than others. But the interest is not suddenly "absent" when it comes to people
without criminal histories.2 °8
What is absent is "the diminished expectation of privacy., 20 9 But the diminished
expectation that results from encounters with the criminal justice system only
affects the balancing of public and private interests in using DNAfor authentica-
tion of personal identity.210 It is not a convincing justification for using the profile
for criminal investigations.21 The "diminished expectation" rationale seems to
have originated in a 1992 opinion of the Fourth Circuit in Jones v. Murray,21 2 the
first federal appellate case to address the constitutionality of a law enforcement
DNA database.21 3 Six inmates challenged a Virginia statute that required them, as
convicted felons, to submit blood samples for DNA analysis "for the creation of a
data bank of the information for future law enforcement purposes." 214 The Fourth
Court responded as follows:
205. Id. at 337.
206. See, e.g., United States v. Carter, 325 F. App'x 308, 309-10 (5th Cir. 2009) (analyzing recidivism
statistics to rebut defendant's argument).
207. See Murphy, Relative Doubt, supra note 13, at 306.
208. And it is not entirely absent for those with criminal histories but not one that would have triggered DNA
collection under the laws in place at the time of their offenses. See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
209. Kaye, Fourth Amendment, supra note 114.
210. See id.
211. See, e.g., id.; Kaye & Smith, supra note 93, at 429-30.
242. 962 F.2d 302 (4th Cir. 1992).
213. Kaye, Constitutionality, supra note 120, at 488; see Jones, 962 F.2d at 302.
214. Jones, 962 F.2d at 302.
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With the person's loss of liberty upon arrest comes the loss of at least some, if
not all, rights to personal privacy otherwise protected by the Fourth Amend-
ment. Thus, persons lawfully arrested on probable cause and detained lose a
right of privacy from routine searches of the cavities of their bodies and their
jail cells, as do convicted felons. Even probationers lose the protection of the
Fourth Amendment with respect to their right to privacy against searches of
their homes pursuant to an established program to ensure rehabilitation and
security.
Similarly, when a suspect is arrested upon probable cause, his identification
becomes a matter of legitimate state interest and he can hardly claim privacy in
it. We accept this proposition because the identification of suspects is relevant
not only to solving the crime for which the suspect is arrested, but also for
maintaining a permanent record to solve other past and future crimes. This
becomes readily apparent when we consider the universal approbation of
"booking" procedures that are followed for every suspect arrested for a felony,
whether or not the proof of a particular suspect's crime will involve the use of
fingerprint identification. Thus a tax evader is fingerprinted just the same as is a
burglar. While we do not accept even this small level of intrusion for free
persons without Fourth Amendment constraint, the same protections do not
hold true for those lawfully confined to the custody of the state. As with
fingerprinting, therefore, we find that the Fourth Amendment does not require
an additional finding of individualized suspicion before blood can be taken
from incarcerated felons for the purpose of identifying them.2t 5
The court was correct in observing that some aspects of Fourth Amendment
"privacy" could not apply to lawfully detained individuals.2 16 They can hardly
claim the same interest in freedom of movement and in withholding definitive
proof of their true identity as can most of the population.21 7 To this extent, privacy
is diminished. But neither of these two interests supports using the database of true
identities for fishing expeditions in the sea of unsolved crimes. The limitation of
freedom of movement helps allow the physical sampling, while the identity-
authentication exception allows the identification profiling and the recording of the
information in a database.21 8 This is the only relevance of these diminutions in
privacy. It is the separate interest in linking crimes to criminals that justifies
trawling for matches to crime-scene fingerprints or DNA profiles. 2 9 The privacy
diminution identified in Jones and reiterated in later cases neither adds to nor
subtracts from that part of the balancing. 2
215. Id. at 306-07 (citations omitted).
216. See id.
217. See id.
218. See Kaye, Constitutionality, supra note 120, at 485-86.
219. See id. at 488; Jones, 962 F.2d at 307.
220. See Kaye, Fourth Amendment, supra note 114; Kaye & Smith, supra note 93, at 447-48 (stating that a
population-wide DNA database would not interfere with anonymity).
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Against the state's interests we must weigh the individuals' Fourth Amendment
interests in being free from the physical intrusion of DNA sampling and the
subsequent use of the samples in both inner-directed and outer-directed trawls. 22'
As previously noted, the courts have uniformly upheld the government's forcing
its way into the bodies of convicted offenders under a special-needs balancing test
or a similar totality-of-the-circumstances test that allows for searches directed at
individuals still under correctional supervision.222 Relative Doubt does not ques-
tion the determination that the collection process is minimally intrusive and that
the invasion of informational privacy is relatively minor in these circumstances.
223
What changes when we add the effects of kinship matching to the balance? The
fundamental insight of Relative Doubt is that this question must be confronted for
both the database inhabitants and their relatives.224
B. Database Inhabitants'Interests in Avoiding Outer-directed Trawls
We already have noted the database inhabitant's interests in freedom of
movement, bodily integrity, and privacy of medically sensitive information.225
DNA sampling for inner-directed trawling does not significantly infringe any of
these interests. According to Relative Doubt, kinship matching invades additional
"interests of databased persons." 226 Obviously, these additional interests cannot lie
in the process of physically sampling the DNA itself-the factor courts have
emphasized in finding DNA sampling for databases to be a search.2 27 The physical
intrusion remains minimal for the database inhabitant (and nonexistent for the
relative).228 We must look elsewhere.
1. "A Blooming Family Tree"
"First," Professor Murphy announces, "familial searches effectively transform
the acquired information from a glorified genetic social security number into a
blooming family tree.",229 By this, she seems to mean: (1) police might ask the
database inhabitant if he has any parents, children or brothers or sisters, and his
answers might inform the police of "abandoned parental bonds, adoptee relation-
221. See Jones, 962 F.2d at 307.
222. See Kaye, Fourth Amendment, supra note 114.
223. See generally Murphy, Relative Doubt, supra note 13.
224. See id. at 314-19 (analyzing how DNA databases affect database inhabitants and their relatives).
225. See supra Section II.B for a general discussion of database inhabitants' Fourth Amendment interests.
226. Murphy, Relative Doubt, supra note 13, at 314.
227. See United States v. Weikert, 504 F.3d 1, 10-14 (1st Cir. 2007) (focusing on physical sampling of blood in
analysis of reasonableness of search and seizure).
228. See Murphy, Relative Doubt, supra note 13, at 317-18 (stating intrusion into relatives' privacy occurs
through the follow-up investigation, not the physical sampling).
229. Id. at 315.
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ships, children conceived through technology, even family secrets about paternal
identity"; 23 ° or (2) he might eventually learn of biological relationships of which
he had been unaware, as when "an offender informed of a partial match...
later learns that the offense was ultimately attributed to the child of his old flame,
or that of his father's long-time coworker.,
2 3 1
These unusual scenarios fall short of a fully blossoming family tree, and neither
justifies the conclusion that outer-directed trawling renders sample acquisition
unreasonable. In bold strokes, the normal doctrinal analysis is as follows. First,
with regard to the pressure on the database inhabitant to talk about his biological
relations and social family, DNA sampling for the purpose of possible outer-
directed trawling, by itself, does not expose "family secrets., 232 It merely identi-
fies database inhabitants who might have a close relative who might have
committed a specific, unsolved crime. The police may locate these relatives for
further investigation from public records or from questioning private individuals.
In many cases, the police will have no interest in and no need to interrogate the
database inhabitant. This could be the case for the two brothers Joe (the database
inhabitant) and Jim (the rapist from outside the database) in Part I.B. Even if the
police do need to ask Joe if he has a brother, simply posing questions is not a
search.233 Joe's interests in being free from unreasonable searches therefore should
not prevent the police from asking him to talk about his family members, let alone
from finding them through other, legal means.234
Second, the possibility that Joe will learn things he did not know before the
police investigation does not implicate a security interest within the scope of the
Fourth Amendment. 35 Many searches can lead to disturbing findings about
relatives or other matters, but this possibility does not make them any the less
reasonable. Furthermore, even if one were to reject this conception of the interests
protected by the Fourth Amendment as too cramped, a system that provides for
judicial review of the grounds for interrogation and that minimizes the revelation
of unwanted knowledge meets the Fourth Amendment reasonableness standard.
The details of and the qualifications to this analysis follow.
230. See id.
231. See id.
232. See Kaye, Constitutionality, supra note 120, at 506.
233. See, e.g., Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491,497 (1983) (plurality opinion explaining that "law enforcement
officers do not violate the Fourth Amendment by merely approaching an individual on the street or in another
public place, by asking him if he is willing to answer some questions, by putting questions to him if the person is
willing to listen, or by offering in evidence in a criminal prosecution his voluntary answers to such questions");
see also infra note 238.
234. See id.
235. Cf Greely et al., supra note 14, at 255-66.
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a. The desire to keep quiet
That a database inhabitant "may feel torn [about] identifying relatives, poten-
tially exposing them to intrusive investigation" 236 does not give him a privilege to
withhold relevant information. 37 Questioning an individual is not an invasion of a
Fourth Amendment right23 8 -even if the individual is compelled to answer.239 The
evils that motivated the Fourth Amendment were intrusions into the security of the
person, interference with the enjoyment of property, and seizing private papers.
240
True, a database inhabitant such as Joe may have a strong desire to avoid
implicating a close relative, but it is not clear that this desire translates into any
significant Fourth Amendment interest.
241
A hypothetical case highlights the problem with the premise that the Amend-
ment protects a bare desire for secrecy in family matters. Bad Sibling is a
counterfeiter. Good Sibling does not know this, but she finds a stack of crisp, new
$20 bills in Bad's room and helps herself to a few of them, fully intending to
replace them later. The two siblings go out to a party that spills out onto the streets.
The police arrest them for public drunkenness and take them to the station house.
There, the police inventory their possessions.242 A perceptive officer sees that
Good's wallet contains crisp, new bills that, on inspection, appear to be counterfeit.
She sends them to a fingerprint analyst, who finds Bad's fingerprints on one of the
bills taken from Good's wallet.243 The police obtain a warrant to search Bad's
apartment, where they find more of the bills. Good deeply regrets inadvertently
leading the police to the now estranged and convicted sib, but Good has no Fourth
Amendment claim.2 44
The example of the brothers, Joe and Jim, in Part L.A is similar. The police had a
court order to take Joe's DNA, and they found that it did not match the rapist's
236. Murphy, Relative Doubt, supra note 13, at 315.
237. Cf. Greely et al., supra note 14, at 256 ("The argument that the police inappropriately invade a person's
privacy by asking, without any obligation, about his relatives, is very weak."). The existence of a statutory or
common law spousal privilege, together with the absence of a privilege for "family secrets" about genealogy, cuts
against a claim of a reasonable expectation in privacy for the latter.
238. E.g., Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Court of Nev., Humboldt Cnty., 542 U.S. 177, 178 (2004); Florida v.
Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 437 (1991); INS v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 215-21 (1984); Royer, 460 U.S. at 497. If the
database inhabitant is not free to terminate the interrogation, there is a seizure of the person, which requires
objective justification. Delgado, 466 U.S. at 215-21; Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721, 728 (1969).
239. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 353-54 (1974).
240. See, e.g., Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 622-30 (1886); cf Delgado, 466 U.S. at 215 ("The Fourth
Amendment does not proscribe all contact between the police and citizens, but is designed 'to prevent arbitrary
and oppressive interference by enforcement officials with the privacy and personal security of individuals."')
(quoting United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 554 (1976)).
241. On the distinction between desires and interests, see, for example, KAuIZ, supra note 135, at 30-31.
242. As allowed under Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367, 370-76 (1987).
243. As allowed under United States v. Edwards, 415 U.S. 800, 806-08 (1974).
244. See id. at 807 ("[O]nce the accused is lawfully arrested and is in custody, the effects in his possession at
the place of detention that were subject to search... may lawfully be searched and seized without a war-
rant ... ").
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DNA. But the eyewitness reported Joe Suspect looked like the rapist, and the
police computed a sibship likelihood ratio of 1010. Now suppose the police seek an
arrest warrant or a warrant to take Jim's DNA. They submit an affidavit relating the
genetic and the other evidence pointing to Jim as the rapist. Should the judge issue
the warrants?
If there is any hesitancy, it is not because of Joe's bare desire to keep Jim out of
trouble. Nor does it seem right to say the police should not have computed the
likelihood ratio without a court's permission.245 They had to ascertain the DNA
profiles from the semen and from Joe to include or exclude him as a source of the
semen. In effect, they performed an inner-directed trawl on a database of size 1.
Computing the likelihood ratio constituted an outer-directed trawl, but the only
interest of Joe's that the mathematical exercise infringed was his possible desire to
shield Jim from suspicion. It did not invade his person or property. 246 The only
information it revealed about his family was the fact that his brother was worth
investigating as a possible source of the semen.24 7 No matter how honorable or
loyal Joe's desire may seem to the two brothers, it should not stand in the way of
the warrants.
In opposition to this analysis, one can argue that interrogating a database
inhabitant rather than just the database is simply the final step of a search process
that starts with the compulsory collection of his DNA and ends with his voluntary
(or possibly compulsory) interrogation about family secrets. If a search were
defined this expansively, it could be compared to deriving personal information
from the hypothetical pregnancy test in Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives'
Association.248 The risk that the individual will be questioned about this informa-
tion then should be part of the balancing that determines reasonableness. Nonethe-
less, this generous definition of the search-never before has the questioning of
individuals been considered a search 24 9-- does not overcome the fundamental
point that the database inhabitant's interest in not having to be questioned about his
family is not a weighty Fourth Amendment interest. 250 The interest in avoiding
embarrassing questions should not tip the balance in a new direction.2 5 1 Further-
more, this interest would be protected, as much as the Fourth Amendment protects
any interest, by having a magistrate review the results of the outer-directed trawl
and the other information the police have assembled before allowing any contact
245. For a discussion of likelihood ratios, see Section I.
246. See id.
247. See id.
248. 489 U.S. 602, 617 (1989) (stating that chemical analysis of urine sample could reveal evidence of
pregnancy); see also supra note 135 and accompanying text.
249. See cases cited, supra note 238.
250. See infra text accompanying notes 305-08.
251. See infra note 308.
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with the database inhabitant.252
b. The desire not to know
The second concern about the family tree as it relates to the database inhabitant
was that the police or the trial might "uncover facts that even the parties do not
know. '253 Relative Doubt buttresses this concern with references to the "societal
interest in maintaining and promoting intact, healthy family units' 254 as mani-
fested "for example, by authorizing spousal privilege ' 255 and goes so far as to
propose "the mere awareness by Good Sibling that Bad Sibling's conviction now
leaves her susceptible to this kind of intrusion may itself generate tension"
sufficient to sever family bonds.256
The last suggestion is implausible. That Bad Sibling has earned her name
already must be a source of tension in the family. Some families may disown Bad
Sibling in response to the damage done to them and others by her criminality and
conviction. In these situations, additional anger at "susceptibility" to becoming a
suspect in crimes involving DNA evidence is irrelevant, for the family unit would
be disrupted anyway. Therefore, the argument must be that Good Sibling would
have maintained family ties with Bad Sibling despite the pain caused by Bad
Sibling's transgressions but upon realizing that police can exploit Bad Sibling's
DNA in a way that could make her "susceptible" to suspicion, she suddenly will
"sever family bonds." Yet, how many Good Siblings are likely to feel that much
additional remorse or anger toward Bad Sibling just because Bad Sibling not only
got herself convicted but also got her DNA into the DNA database in a state that
uses outer-directed trawling?
A firmer, but much narrower, basis for the intactness argument uses the
following sort of scenario: 257 A near miss leads the police to suspect a first-degree
relative of the database inhabitant, say, a father named Good Dad. When the police
test the Good Dad's DNA, they discover that his genotype is inconsistent with
paternity. They tell Dad he is no longer a suspect because he is not related to the
man he thought was his son. The consequence of this disclosure is something other
than marital bliss.
Although the scenario is unlikely in an advanced database with Y-markers or a
large number of autosomal SNPs and STRs, it could occur if the crime-scene
sample was too limited to permit many loci to be tested. Even if it does occur,
252. See, e.g., Boroian v. Mueller, 616 F.3d 60, 70-71 (1st Cir. 2010) (holding retention and matching of
individual's DNA sample in computer database did not violate Fourth Amendment).
253. Murphy, Relative Doubt, supra note 13, at 315.
254. Id. at 319.
255. Id.
256. Id. at 320.
257. See Robin Williams & Paul Johnson, Inclusiveness, Effectiveness and Intrusiveness: Issues in the
Developing Uses of DNA Profiling in Support of Criminal Investigations, 34 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 234,244 (2006)
(describing scenario).
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however, there is no reason to inform Dad of nonpaternity. He need only know that
his DNA does not match the crime-scene sample-something that could have
happened regardless of paternity.25 8 If the police gratuitously disclose nonpater-
nity, and if this is what is unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment, then the
police will be liable in a civil action brought by Dad or the illegitimate son.
Given this remedy, prohibiting all outer-directed trawling as unconstitutional is
only one way-and an extreme one at that-to protect this interest. A database
system in which police are trained properly and which is supplemented by liability
for unreasonable disclosures of private, family information should preserve the
balance in favor of the state.2 5 9 And, if that were not enough, a statute could
provide for judicial review to ensure the police have probable cause, based on the
likelihood ratio for relatedness and other information about the case, to move the
investigation in the direction of particular relatives.
Fourth Amendment reasonableness requires no more than this procedure. Even
a search of a dwelling can reveal extremely embarrassing or harmful information
about an individual and his family. The result could be "profound social, cultural
and physical impacts on that family.' '260 With probable cause, in the judgment of a
magistrate, the search can proceed despite this risk. Similarly, judicial verification
that there is probable cause to suspect that a first-degree relative is the source of a
crime-scene sample guarantees that outer-directed trawling combined with a
reasonable investigation into who this relative might be satisfies the Fourth
Amendment.26 1
Even without judicial supervision of the follow-up investigation, the conclusion
that interests of database inhabitants such as Good Dad in avoiding outer-directed
trawls do not render sample acquisition unreasonable finds some support in the
opinion in United States v. Pool.262 In Pool, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district
court's determination that an indicted defendant had to provide a DNA sample
before being released on bail.263 Giving little weight to the interest of relatives who
might be implicated by kinship matching, the panel discounted the argument that
performing outer-directed trawls would have made arrestee DNA sampling imper-
258. Cf Greely et al., supra note 14, at 255 (describing the police discovery, in the absence of its disclosure to
the relative, as "an invasion of privacy with no resulting harm").
259. See Suter, supra note 7, at 393-94 (stating policies promoting training of police and discouraging
disclosure of family secrets would help meet privacy concerns associated with familial searching).
260. Murphy, Relative Doubt, supra note 13, at 319 (quoting Erica Haimes, Social and Ethical Issues in the
Use of Familial Searching in Forensic Investigations: Insights from Family and Kinship Studies, 34 J.L. MED. &
ETHICS 263, 269 (2006)).
261. While familial relationship does not alone constitute probable cause, courts analyze facts other than
familial relationship to determine whether probable cause exists. See Poolaw v. Marcantel, 565 F.3d 721, 730-31
(10th Cir. 2009) ("A familial relationship to someone suspected of criminal activity, without more, does not
constitute probable cause to search or arrest.").
262. 621 F.3d 1213, 1221, 1228 (9th Cir. 2010), vacated as moot 659 F.3d 761 (9th Cir. 2011).
263. Id. at 1228.
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missible.26 4 It stated:
This seems somewhat analogous to a witness looking at a photograph of one
person and stating that the perpetrator has a similar appearance which leads the
police to show the witness photos of similar looking individuals, one of whom
the witness identifies as the perpetrator. It is questionable whether the person
whose photograph helped focus the inquiry, or whose familial comparison
helped focus the inquiry, has suffered any invasion of his or her constitutional
right to privacy.
265
The court's dicta are not related to the issue of standing.26 6 As in the examples of
Good Sibling and Joe Suspect, the person in the photograph is asserting the
collection, profiling, and outer-directed trawling of their DNA is unreasonable as
to him. But the Fourth Amendment is not a statute protecting "genetic privacy" or
family relations in general.2 67 Adding the database inhabitant's interests in
avoiding outer-directed searches does little to change the balance of all the
interests.
2. More Markers
Second, Relative Doubt suggests testing "Y-STRs or single nucleotide polymor-
phisms (SNPs) ' 268 is a greater threat to informational privacy than merely
examining autosomal STRs. Professor Murphy believes "Y-STR testing indisput-
ably reveals biological relationships, 269 and it might be used "for identifying
possible surnames.' 270 The notion that these different loci are more threatening
than autosomal STR loci deserves some inspection. I start by clarifying the limited
role of Y-STRs in kinship trawling, then discuss SNPs, and conclude with some
comments on surname inference.
To begin with, identical or nearly identical Y-STR haplotypes merely imply (to a
high probability) a common male ancestor sometime in the past few centuries.2 7' If
264. See id. at 1221.
265. Id. at 1221. One judge dissented from the result in the case, but she did not discuss the argument about
outer-directed trawling. See id. at 1234-38 (Schroeder, J., dissenting). A similar analogy appears in D.H. Kaye,
Bioethics, Bench, and Bar: Selected Arguments, in Landry v. Attorney General, 40 JURIMETRICS J. 193, 205-06
(2000).
266. See id.
267. Treating information about family matters (or anything else) differently because it is disclosed through
DNA testing rather than through more conventional investigative methods is a form of "genetic exceptionalism."
Prainsack, supra note 6, at 29.
268. Murphy, Relative Doubt, supra note 13, at 315.
269. Id.
270. Id.
271. Every few centuries, a change in the Y-STR haplotype might occur and propagate in the spermatozoa of
an offspring. If this man has a surviving line of male children, the result is a splitting of the paternal line into the
old haplotype and a new "clan" of men with the mutated progenitor as the patriarch. But men with different
patriarchs also can have the same Y-haplotype. This occurs when a later mutation produces a convergence back to
the earlier haplotype. Such convergence is unusual, but even if no two male clans share the same Y-haplotype, two
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one searches back far enough in time, all men have such "biological relation-
ships. 272 For example, as many as one in 12 Irishmen may be within the paternal
line of the Fifth Century warlord known as Niall of the Nine Hostages.273
Y-haplotyping thus raises a possibility that police genealogists will notice the
database inhabitant has the same haplotype as, for example, a famous person
(living or deceased, whose haplotype is published or otherwise discoverable).
From this, they might infer (to some probability) that the database inhabitant can
count this person as a relative. Placing a prisoner of Irish descent in the same
haplogroup as Niall would not seem especially harmful, but a possible relationship
to personages such as Hitler and Stalin, whose haplogroups are listed on Wikipe-
dia,274 seems more problematic.
The extent to which police will want to play such genealogy games is open to
question. Police laboratories frequently obtain Y-STR profiles of suspects in rape
cases aid in the analysis of samples containing the DNA of several individuals, and
there is no evidence that police or laboratory workers are using them for such
diversions. In any event, the practice does not advance criminal investigations and
can be prohibited. The special value of Y-STRs in outer-directed trawling lies in
their ability to exclude the possibility the database inhabitant and the crime-scene-
sample contributor are both very recent lineal descendants of the same man (or a
father-child pair).275 When the Y-STRs do not match, the unidentified crime-scene
sample almost certainly does not come from a recent, close male relative of a
database inhabitant. This means the kinship index (for patrilineal associations) will
be small, and the database inhabitant will not emerge as a likely lead. The failure of
the database inhabitant's name to rise toward the top of the list poses few, if any,
threats to anyone's privacy. Conversely, when the Y-STRs do match, the likelihood
ratio usually gets a big boost, just as it does from a series of matching autosomal
alleles. No particular harm arises from the use of Y-haplotypes in a well run
database.
Next, using single nucleotide polymorphisms instead of, or in addition to, short
tandem repeat polymorphisms in kinship analysis does not necessarily produce a
greater invasion of privacy. The issue is what the particular SNPs might show
above and beyond relatedness. Some SNPs are "noise" rather than meaningful
genetic information, just as some STRs are. Other SNPs affect the expression of
men who are lineal descendants of the most recent mutated patriarch can be distant relatives who are unknown to
one another. See generally Mark D. Shriver & Rick A. Kitties, Opinion, Genetic Ancestry and the Search for
Personalized Genetic Histories, 5 NATURE REvs. GENETIcS 611 (2004).
272. See id. at613-17.
273. L.T. Moore et al., A Y-chromosome Signature of Hegemony in Gaelic Ireland, 78 AM. J. HUM. GENETICS
334(2006).
274. List of Haplogroups of Historical and Famous Figures, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/
Famous haplogroup-members.
275. See Murphy, Relative Doubt, supra note 13, at 315-16 (discussing uncovering relationships and
excluding possibilities of relationships).
[Vol. 50:109
THE GENEALOGY DETECTIVES
proteins, but this does not automatically make them medically or socially signifi-
cant data. Ordinary blood groupings are based on SNPs. Learning that an
individual is Group 0 (as I am) does not seem like a major invasion of privacy.
Serologists used this kind of information in case after case in the decades before
DNA profiling became part of the forensic scientist's armamentarium-with no
apparent ill effects on personal privacy. Modem DNA profiles routinely include
the allele of a gene (known as amelogenin) that codes for a major component of the
tooth enamel matrix. A shorter version of the allele occurs on the X-chromosome,
making it a convenient way to determine the sex of the source of the crime-scene
DNA.27 6 This analysis of coding DNA has not been thought to create a significant
privacy issue.
Finally, isonomy (shared surnames) has little to do with outer-directed trawling.
It is a conceivable investigative technique for guessing the name of a source of
DNA recovered from a crime-scene.277 Like inferring red hair color from SNPs in
a semen stain,278 it does not require access to the offender database.279 Moreover,
like physical appearance, handwriting, and voice, a recorded family name is not
normally a deeply private matter.28 °
C. Relatives'Interests in Avoiding Outer-directed Trawls
That the proffered interests of the database inhabitant in avoiding outer-directed
trawling, do not alter the balance in favor of the state does not exhaust the analysis.
What of the first-degree relatives who could become targets of the investigation?
As Relative Doubt argues, surely their Fourth Amendment interests must be
counted and weighed at some point.28' In doing so, we must attend again to the
nexus between precise interests that can be asserted and the values underlying the
276. GOODWIN ETAL., supra note 25, at 69.
277. See, e.g., Peter Gill, DNA as Evidence-The Technology of Identification, 352 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2669,
2670 (2005). Professor Murphy has sworn that research demonstrates deducing surnames from Y-STRs works
"with alarming accuracy." Declaration of Erin Murphy in Support of Plaintiffs' Reply Brief re: Motion for
Preliminary Injunction at 3, Haskell v. Brown, 677 F. Supp. 2d 1187 (N.D. Cal. 2009). As described in KAYE,
DOUBLE HELIX, supra note 21, at 210-11, a study in the United Kingdom reported correct predictions of surnames
(based on the closest 17-locus STR haplotypes in a table of haplotypes and surnames derived from a random
sample of men) in less than one in five instances. Even for less common surnames, prediction was only accurate in
one in three instances. Better results should be possible, at least in some societies, but factors such as adoptions,
infidelity, and name changes limit accuracy and utility. See Turi E. King & Mark A. Jobling, Founders, Drift, and
Infidelity: The Relationship Between Y Chromosome Diversity and Patrilineal Surnames, 26 MOLECULAR
BIOLOGY & EVOLUTION 1093, 1093 (2009); Alberto G6mez et al., Correlation Analysis of Surnames and
Y-Chromosome Genetic Heritage in 3 Provinces of Southwestern Colombia, 28 BIOMEDICA 357, 363-65 (2008).
278. On this procedure, see, for example, Wojciech Branicki et al., Determination of Phenotype Associated
SNPs in the MCIR Gene, 52 J. FORENSIC Sci. 349, 352-54 (2007).
279. To facilitate guessing surnames, the database could be used to create a table of haplotypes and surnames;
so could private genealogy databases.
280. See United States v. Mara, 410 U.S. 19, 21-22 (1973) (handwriting); United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S.
1, 13-15 (1973) (voice).
281. Murphy, Relative Doubt, supra note 13, at 317-18.
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Fourth Amendment.282 Not all harms to individuals can be brought under the
Amendment's protective umbrella. In particular, the interests cited in Relative
Doubt (as well as other commentary) can find little shelter there. 283 With
outer-directed trawling, no relative is detained or asked to submit to a syringe, a
swab, or even a touch. The relative's interest in bodily integrity therefore does
nothing to change the balance that courts have found to favor the government.
Again, we must look elsewhere.
1. Sheltering Evidence of Guilt
Certainly, near-miss searching could reveal things a relative would rather keep
private. For one thing, a relative might be concerned that kinship matching will
expose him as the perpetrator of an unsolved crime (and incidentally jeopardize the
family integrity that Relative Doubt characterizes as a constitutional value).2 84 A
trawl with this outcome would harm the relative (and quite possibly the family),
285
but this kind of harm cannot count in any Fourth Amendment calculus.2 86 By itself,
the discovery that an individual is responsible for a crime does not infringe a
legitimate interest, let alone an interest that the Fourth Amendment respects.287
Thus, Relative Doubt wisely dismisses the desire of guilty relatives to escape
detection in its catalog of individual interests. 288 However, the irrelevance of this
harm is not just a matter of a lack of "empathy" and the fact that "[i]t is certainly
difficult to get too exercised about the privacy rights of the actual perpetrator.
289
One should be exercised about violations of those rights-if they are indeed rights
under the Fourth Amendment. But they are not. The Fourth Amendment does not
protect information per se; it protects individuals against oppressive methods of
acquiring that information.29 °
282. Parts of the analysis of these interests that follows are adapted from David H. Kaye, DNA Database
Trawls and the Definition of a Search in Boroian v. Mueller, 97 VA. L. REV. IN BRIEF 41,46-49 (2011) [hereinafter
Kaye, DNA Database Trawls].
283. See id.; Murphy, Relative Doubt, supra note 13, at 317-18.
284. See id.
285. See id. at 319.
286. Cf. Kaye, DNA Database Trawls, supra note 282, at 46-47 (referring to database inhabitant rather than a
relative).
287. See, e.g., Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 408-09 (2005); United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109,
124-25 (1984); United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 703-06 (1983); cf. Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170
(1984) (holding no-trespassing signs and locked gates on "open fields" are insufficient to create a "legitimate"
expectation of privacy against inspection of the land).
288. See generally Murphy, Relative Doubt, supra note 13 (discussing other interests which could be violated
by familial DNA searches).
289. Id. at 318-19.
290. Compare Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 623, 631-32 (1886) (describing the Amendment as
protecting private information even against a lawful search), and Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298, 309
(1921) ("[Search warrants] may not be used as a means of gaining access to a man's house or office and papers
solely for the purpose of [securing] evidence to be used against him .. "), with Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 73
(1906) (limiting the application of the Fourth Amendment to subpoenas), and Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S.
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2. Avoiding False Convictions
Relatives also can be harmed by an outer-directed trawl that calls them to the
attention of the police when they are innocent of the crimes to which they
apparently are linked. A false alarm could occur if the database inhabitant is not
related to the source of the crime-scene DNA but coincidentally shares a profile
that has a very large kinship index with respect to the crime-scene sample. Or, the
database inhabitant could have the deduced genetic relationship to the criminal,
but this discovery leads the police to someone like Good Dad in Part IV.B. 1.b, who
does not actually stand in that genetic relationship to him. The probability of
coincidental partial matches can be controlled by the procedures outlined in Part I,
but some false alarms are inevitable. Nevertheless, these false alarms should not
lead to false convictions. Before trial, a sample taken from the false lead will have
to be compared to the DNA from the crime scene. If the false lead is not the source
of the crime-scene DNA, this individual normally will be excluded as a suspect.2 9'
Of course, even if there were no false alarms in associating database inhabitants
with crime-scene samples left by first-degree relatives, some false convictions
could occur. After all, even if all near-miss events were proof perfect of related-
ness, a kinship match would not necessarily be conclusive proof of guilt. For one
thing, the police or someone else might have planted his DNA at the crime-
scene.292 Such possibilities are not special to kinship trawling (or to biological
evidence). On occasion, ordinary inner-directed database matches could produce
false convictions, if, for example, a laboratory mistypes the crime-scene sample,
which then matches that of a database inhabitant.2 93 The per capita risk for this
outcome seems no higher for outer-directed trawls than for inner-directed trawls,
making it hard to discern why a balancing test would come out differently.
294
391, 431-32 (1976) (Marshall, J., concurring) (decrying the Court's rejection of Boyd's information-centric
perspective).
291. KAYE ET AL., WIGMORE, supra note 20, at § 13.3.2, 603.
292. Id. § 13.3.1, at 600-02 nn.7-9.
293. There are instances in which a laboratory or other organization has swapped crime-scene samples or
contaminated a crime-scene sample with DNA from another individual who became a database inhabitant at some
point. See Jeremy Gans, Ozymandias on Trial: Wrongs and Rights in DNA Cases, in CRIMINAL EVIDENCE AND
HUMAN RIGHTS 195, 197-99 (Paul Roberts & Jill Hunter eds., 2012) (discussing the case of Farah Jama). See
generally William C. Thompson, Tarnish On The 'Gold Standard': Recent Problems In Forensic DNA Testing,
THE CHAMPION, Jan.-Feb. 2006, at 10; DNA Blunder: Man Accused of Rape After Human Error, BBC NEWS (Mar,
21, 2012), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-manchester-17460661. In one case in Australia, this type of
error led to a false conviction. Gans, supra. These incidents illustrate the need to implement quality control
systems that reduce the chance of handling and other error, but even with reasonable precautions in place, the law
of large numbers means that low-probability events will occur eventually.
294. Although false convictions due to properly conducted DNA trawls are not high probability events, even if
they were, the interest in accurate factfinding at trial does not belong on the individual's side of the ledger. Instead,
it diminishes the state's interest in acquiring DNA for database trawls.
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3. Being a Suspect
The investigative process is not painless for the apparent relative, who must
suffer the distress of being the target of a police investigation. As Professor Hank
Greely observed, "I don't think anybody's going to be falsely convicted .... It's
the time, hassle and indignity of being interviewed by the police. How much is that
worth? How much does that cost a person? I don't know, but it's not zero. 29 5
Professor Murphy vividly describes the possible cost of a prolonged investigation
when she asks us to
consider Richard Jewell (the wrongly identified Atlanta bomber) or Stephen
Hatfill (the wrongly identified anthrax mailer) or the members of the Duke
University lacrosse team (falsely accused of rape). The worst indignity of an
investigation can be living under a cloud of suspicion; even mere suspicion,
quickly dispelled, has the potential to disrupt a career, destroy a marriage, or
ruin a life.
2 9 6
The individual interest in being free from falsely incriminating trawls surely is
legitimate, and the risk of harm to relatives from a false near-match is not zero. But
does the risk even count in the Fourth Amendment calculus? The false-
incrimination objection to DNA database trawls goes not to the impact of the
information-gathering technique on privacy, but to the accuracy of the inferences
that can be drawn from the information. For better or worse, beyond the threshold
for probable cause, the Fourth Amendment does not protect against mistaken
reasoning about evidence.297 In a classic search of a home, police could find
planted contraband or ambiguous evidence. It is enough that police, in the
informed judgment of a magistrate issuing a warrant, have a sufficient basis to
believe that the search will produce potentially useful information.298
The Fourth Amendment protects certain kinds of privacy, such as the undis-
turbed possession or enjoyment of one's dwelling.299 It means the police must
have a sufficient factual basis or other justification for interfering with that
privacy.3°° But the Amendment does not protect against mistaken inferences from
295. Nakashima, supra note 11, at A1 (intemal quotation marks omitted).
296. Murphy, Relative Doubt, supra note 13, at 314. Other scenarios seem less compelling. See, e.g., Mark
Henderson, DNA Database 'Puts Innocent Under Suspicion,' THE TIMES (LONDON), Sept. 18, 2007, available at
http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/uk/crime/article2477559.ece (quoting Professor Carole McCartney as
posing the following case: "My local off-licence was recently subject to an armed robbery .... My DNA will be
all over the place, but I'm not actually a criminal, I'm just a chocolate-eating wine drinker.").
297. Kaye, DNA Database Trawls, supra note 282, at 47.
298. Id.
299. See, e.g., Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 120 (2006) (holding warrantless entry of suspect's home
based on permission from his wife was a violation of the Fourth Amendment when the suspect was present and
had refused consent to search).
300. See Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238-39 (1983) (applying the test that for a search warrant for a
dwelling to issue, the judge must find based on totality of the circumstances set forth in affidavit that there is a fair
probability that incriminating evidence will be found in the dwelling).
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the fruits of a reasonable search, whether warranted or warrantless. 30 ' As with
being marched into the grand jury room, the interest in not being a target or even a
part of an investigation can be highly meaningful to the individual but quite
outside the zone of Fourth Amendment protection.3 °2 Whether it should count in
the balancing test therefore is open to question. And, even if it does count, the harm
in becoming a suspect when a DNA test can promptly dispel the suspicion may be
no more severe for the relative of the database inhabitant than it was for database
inhabitant. This factor therefore does not seem to make outer-directed trawling
constitutionally unreasonable..
Relative Doubt argues, however, that misdirected investigations will be more
common with outer-directed trawls: The same innocent relatives will be ap-
proached by the police so often that "a relative would be wise to volunteer a
genetic sample (and thus be more readily excluded) rather than run the risk of
repeated requests for samples that ultimately prove not to match.' ' 30 3 I would not
give most relatives such advice. For a relative to be repeatedly implicated, the
following conditions would have to hold: (1) The crime-scene profile does not
match anyone in the database (no inner-directed match); (2) the crime-scene
profile is such a good partial match that it generates a kinship index for at least one
type of relationship that exceeds the system's threshold (an outer-directed hit); (3)
outer-directed hits to the same database inhabitant occur over and over; and (4)
this oddly affected database inhabitant has an innocent relative to whom the police
would be attracted in these cases.
Envisioning a scenario that fulfills all these conditions is challenging, but here is
one: The database inhabitant (again, we'll call him Joe) has three brothers, three
sisters, two parents, and four sons and four daughters. All are alive, mobile, and
within a plausible age range to be criminal suspects at the relevant times. Brother
Jim has committed four unsolved crimes, leaving his DNA at all of them. He has
no criminal history that would have resulted in the addition of his DNA profile to
the database. Everyone else is an innocent relative. That is, no one else in the
family has a criminal history that would have led to inclusion in the database, and
none of them has committed an undetected crime. An inner-directed trawl for the
profile from Crime 1 excludes Joe and all his parents and children (because the
Crime 1 profile and Joe's profile do not share an allele at every locus). Signifi-
cantly, it produces a full sibship ratio of 1010 for Joe (and it shows that Joe and the
Crime 1 sample have the same set of Y-STRs). Amelogenin as well as the Y-STR
testing establishes that the Crime 1 profile has a Y-chromosome. 30 4 This excludes
301. Kaye, DNA Database Trawls, supra note 282, at 47.
302. See United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 353 (1974) (noting a witness has no right of privacy before a
grand jury and may not decline to answer questions that evoke embarrassing responses or result in an unwelcome
disclosure of his personal affairs).
303. Murphy, Relative Doubt, supra note 13, at 317.
304. See KAYE, DOUBLE HELIX, supra note 21, at 220.
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the three sisters. Out of this very large family of 15 innocent relatives, only the
three brothers are possible suspects in Crime 1. The police ask them for DNA
samples, and they comply. Only Jim's profile matches the Crime 1 profile. Neither
Joe nor the two innocent brothers (nor anyone else in his family) will become
suspects in the other three crimes committed by their errant sibling. Jim's profile
will be added to the database, and the profile from Crimes 2-4 will match Jim's,
just as the Crime 1 profile did. Joe's many relatives should not feel much pressure
to submit their DNA to a database of volunteers.
One might try to modify the details of this example. Perhaps the trace DNA from
the other crimes was too degraded to type at many loci, or perhaps the trace DNA
was a mixture that left open the possibility that an innocent brother was involved. I
cannot prove that no relative at any time in a world of outer-directed trawling will
become a suspect more than once. But these kinds of scenarios seem sufficiently
rare that this concern has little weight.
Moreover even if the prediction were more than a feather, it bears repeating that
it should not matter to the Fourth Amendment calculus. Suppose that Brother Jim
always commits his crimes at high noon and always leaves an envelope with the
message "Inside this envelope is a card that might (or might not) indicate that the
culprit is a relative of a convicted offender." Inside is a printed card reading "One
of Joe's brothers did this. Catch me if you can!" To avoid repeated police
questioning, the exasperated, innocent brothers might offer to wear a device that
transmits their locations at noon of every day. Following Relative Doubt, we could
say "these innocent persons should not have to make such a strategic election when
they are, like all other persons, legally entitled to the full privacy protections of the
Fourth Amendment., 30 5 But can it really be that the Fourth Amendment bars the
police from opening the envelope and then talking with his brothers? The situation
would be no different if Jim did not mean to leave the envelope, but Mother Nature
somehow kept delivering the envelope without his knowledge.
Simply put, the Fourth Amendment does not protect people from becoming
suspects, persons of interest, and the like. It does not protect them from being
questioned30 6 and being followed if they choose not to answer or if the police do
not like their answers. 30 7 "Only when the officer, by means of physical force or
show of authority, has in some way restrained the liberty of a citizen may [the
Court] conclude that a 'seizure' has occurred." 30 8 Thus, in the absence of
reasonable suspicion, the Fourth Amendment does protect people from being
physically restrained, from being frisked, from custodial arrest, and worse.30 9 The
305. Murphy, Relative Doubt, supra note 13, at 317.
306. See cases cited, supra note 238.
307. See United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 281 (1983) (noting a person has no reasonable expectation of
privacy in moving on public thoroughfares).
308. Terry v. Ohio 392, 1, 19 n.16 (1968).
309. See, e.g., id. at 28 (establishing modem "stop-and-frisk" doctrine).
[Vol. 50:109
THE GENEALOGY DETECTIVES
interest Relative Doubt invokes is the interest in not being hassled or discussed in
public by the authorities. This is a good reason to use all results of database trawls
circumspectly, but it is not a factor that alters the Fourth Amendment balance. 1o
4. Maintaining Spatial Anonymity
Finally, a database inhabitant's apparent or actual relative could complain that
forging the link to the crime scene invades the distinct interest in keeping one's
whereabouts secret. An individual's concern with spatial privacy seems to sit more
comfortably within the Fourth Amendment than the desire for freedom from
prosecution or inferential accuracy.311 In United States v. Karo,3 12 for example, the
Supreme Court held that planting a beeper in a container of ether and tracking the
container's movements through houses constituted a search.3 13 A database trawl
might produce a kinship match to DNA recovered from the bedroom of a murdered
woman, which in turn, might lead to the discovery that the database inhabitant's
relative was there (and was having an affair with her).
Nonetheless, the Supreme Court never has viewed the Fourth Amendment as
protecting mere information about a person's locations. "Staking out" a suspect's
residence and "tailing" him gives the police a record of the individual's move-
ments, but that does not make these time-honored practices "searches" that trigger
Fourth Amendment protections. Karo and other cases make it clear that tracking
movements on public thoroughfares do not constitute a search-no matter how
much an individual might desire to keep his movements invisible. Only when the
government has entered-physically or technologically-spaces cloaked in a
reasonable expectation of privacy has the Court treated the gathering of intelli-
gence about the locations of people or objects as a search.3 14 Just because police
investigations establish that individuals visited certain places at certain times does
not mean that they implicate a reasonable expectation of privacy.
The sole exception to this rule is United States v. Jones.3 15 "[F]or four weeks,
law enforcement agents tracked every movement" of a personal automobile by
magnetically attaching an electronic device to the underside of the car.3 16 Every
310. Analytically, it fits better into a due process analysis, but the Supreme Court turned away from this path in
Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 712 (1976) (holding the interest in reputation is not a protected interest under the Due
Process Clause). But see generally Murphy, Relative Doubt, supra note 13 (advocating more substantial due
process protections from government data gathering that would track the locations of individuals).
311. Kaye, DNA Database Trawls, supra note 282, at 48.
312. 468 U.S. 705 (1984).
313. Id. at 712-15 (holding the mere transfer of a can containing an unmonitored beeper was not a search
because it conveyed no information, but by monitoring the beeper's location within a private residence, the
government performed a search for purposes of the Fourth Amendment).
314. See, e.g., Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34-35 (2001) (finding the use of thermal imaging
technology to measure heat emanating from a home to be a search if the technology is not in general public use);
Karo, 468 U.S. at 712-15 (finding the use of technology to gain information from inside a home to be a search).
315. 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012).
316. Id. at 964 (Alito, J., concurring).
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ten seconds, they recorded its transmissions of the vehicle's GPS coordinates.3" 7
Four Justices concluded "secretly monitor[ing] and catalogu[ing] every single
movement of an individual's car for a very long period" constituted a search under
Katz.318 In a separate opinion, Justice Sotomayor explained why: "GPS monitor-
ing generates a precise, comprehensive record of a person's public movements that
reflects a wealth of detail about her familial, political, professional, religious, and
sexual associations. ' 3 9 To provide examples, Justice Sotomayor quoted the New
York Court of Appeals: "[d]isclosed in [GPS] data.. . will be trips the indisput-
ably private nature of which takes little imagination to conjure: trips to the
psychiatrist, the plastic surgeon, the abortion clinic, the AIDS treatment center, the
strip club, the criminal defense attorney, the by-the-hour motel, the union meeting,
the mosque, synagogue or church, the gay bar and on and on.",320 At some point,
the sheer quantity of spatial data poses so grave a danger of revealing unusually
sensitive information about one's movements that "[a]wareness that the Govern-
ment may be watching chills associational and expressive freedoms. 321
Using trace evidence such as DNA to discover the identity of the individual
whose semen, blood, saliva, hairs, or skin cells are in or on a victim's body or other
location does not supply the authorities with a "comprehensive record" that would
have this chilling effect. It is one thing to trail a suspect every moment of every
day. It is another to work backwards from the fact that a murder occurred in a bar to
a list of people who might have been there at some time. It is one thing to place a
television monitor in a bedroom, as in Orwell's 1984. It is another to discover trace
evidence that might have come from an intruder in the same bedroom. Because of
the haphazard and backwards-looking nature of the DNA data, phrases like
"lifelong genetic surveillance" 322 are inapposite. If analyzing trace evidence can
be called surveillance at all, it is far closer to the "relatively short-term monitoring
of a person's movements on public streets" that does not even rise to the level of a
search.323
This is not to say that the interest in spatial anonymity has no weight in a
balancing test, but it is no more significant an interest for the relatives implicated
by outer-directed trawling than it was for the database inhabitants in the many
cases upholding inner-directed trawling. All told, the nature of the interests that
317. Brief for Respondent at 4, United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012) (10-1259), 2011 WL 4479076, at
*4.
318. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 964 (Alito, J., concurring).
319. Id. at 955 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
320. Id. (second alteration in original) (quoting People v. Weaver, 909 N.E.2d 1195, 1199 (N.Y. 2009)).
321. Id. at 956. Combining individual acts of surveillance that are not searches to find a search in the aggregate
has been called a "mosaic theory"-and criticized as unworkable. Orin S. Kerr, The Mosaic Theory of the Fourth
Amendment, 111 MICH. L. REV. 311 (2012).
322. See supra Introduction.




kinship matching implicates and the degree of intrusiveness it produces are not so
different from traditional full-match searching as to compel a different result in the
balancing tests the courts have used.
D. The Unbearable Lightness of Shadow Databases
At this point, I have described two rationales for an advanced system for
generating criminal intelligence from DNA samples, and I have considered the
relationship of this system-involving sampling, profiling, and trawling (of both
types) of the DNA of convicted offenders-to various countervailing individual
interests. I have argued that a system that requires convicted offenders to surrender
DNA samples for identification profiling followed by both inner- and outer-
directed trawling is sustainable under a balancing test (or a categorical exception)
that includes the cognizable interests of both the offenders and their relatives. I
have emphasized that the Fourth Amendment embraces certain privacy interests
but that it does not protect information per se. The violation of the bodily integrity
of offenders and their relatives is minimal or nonexistent, the extent to which
information about family relationships will be exposed is speculative, and the
impact on spatial privacy is intrinsically limited.
Having clarified these matters, we can dispose of Professor Murphy's inventive
efforts to "liken familial DNA searches to unofficial, shadow databases. 32 4
According to Relative Doubt, "allowing a familial search is like saying that the
sampling, typing, and databasing [of] the innocent relatives of convicted persons is
acceptable. 325 Yet, a legislatively approved system specifying the types of trawls
that may be done with the profiles of convicted offenders and limiting the
disclosure of any unexpected findings about biological relationships is hardly a
rogue database created to circumvent statutory requirements and protections.
To this extent, painting outer-directed trawling as a new "shadow database" is
misleading. Demanding convicted offenders and all their brothers, sisters, parents,
and children-and no one else-appear and submit to DNA sampling, profiling,
and inner-directed trawling would be odious. But the system proposed by advo-
cates of "familial searching" does not entail sampling any DNA from any relative.
It does not include profiling any samples from relatives. It does not incorporate
such profiles into the database. Near-miss trawling certainly affects relatives, but
so do many other searches. The effects on relatives arise in ways that often lie
outside the scope of the Fourth Amendment and are less threatening than the
eloquent prose of Relative Doubt suggests. Consequently, when it comes to
sampling DNA from offenders, the courts, taking cognizance of the Fourth
Amendment interests of relatives (and offenders. regarding their relatives), can
come to the same conclusion they have always reached: rebalancing need not
324. Murphy, Relative Doubt, supra note 13, at 338.
325. Id.
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produce different outcomes.
CONCLUSION
The analysis of the constitutional objections to "familial searching" is complete.
The call for careful judicial analysis of outer-directed trawls (when the issue finally
comes to court) is well taken. Certainly, "the Constitution has something to say
about further testing, databasing, and searching of lawfully acquired DNA pro-
files. ' 326 However, the contention "that familial searches should be forbidden
because they embody the very presumptions that our constitutional and evidentiary
rules have long endeavored to counteract: guilt by association, racial discrimina-
tion, propensity, and even biological determinism" 327 is bloated. Notwithstanding
these variegated concerns, an advanced database system should survive an
analysis that attends, at the outset, to the Fourth Amendment interests of database
inhabitants as well as their relatives. The analysis that supports this conclusion
began with the process of acquiring DNA samples for an enhanced database and
proceeded through genotyping suitable identification loci, storing the resulting
profiles in digital form, and repeatedly trawling for identification. It considered the
interests of both the convicted offenders and their relatives.328
326. Id. at 336.
327. Id. at 304.
328. Professor Murphy cites Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 106 (2006), for the proposition that a
"relative has a protected right not to have her own genetic information exposed ... by the fact of her kin's
conviction," because the relative's interest is similar "to the joint interest held by property owners who share
common space." Murphy, Relative Doubt, supra note 13, at 336 (emphasis added). She maintains that "a relative
is, in a sense, a 'joint occupant' of a genetic profile" who "retains the right to keep his or her portion closed from
prying eyes." Murphy, Opposing Viewpoint, supra note 79, at 24 (emphasis added). But what is the actual source
of this "protected right," and in what sense are two relatives "joint occupants" of anything? Although Professor
Murphy may only mean to claim that a relative should have standing to challenge a search, even that conclusion is
dubious, and the catalog of interests examined in Relative Doubt gives rise to no convincing claim of a legal or
moral right. Surely Randolph does not indicate that relatives have the right to keep overlapping DNA alleles from
police scrutiny. Randolph concerns the right to live in a space free from arbitrary physical invasion and inspection.
Given this core interest of the Fourth Amendment, Randolph allows a cohabitant to veto the consent of the other
cohabitant to a police entry. In reaching this result, the Court relied on "widely shared social expectations" to
conclude that one co-tenant "has no recognized authority ... to prevail over a present and objecting co-
tenant ... " Randolph, 547 U.S. at 111, 114. But two people with an atypically large number of STR alleles in
common are not like two people physically occupying the same dwelling. They are more like two individuals who
received similar copies of the same book of commandments from the same ancestors. In what sense do
duplications in the texts give relatives a socially recognized right to prevent other people from reading the copy of
the book that does not belong to them and that the outside reader legitimately acquired from the other sibling? If
anything, legal and social practices show that-in contrast to the true joint occupancy situation in Randolph-
genetic relatedness per se does not create a veto right. For example, a family member has no recognized power to
veto a relative's decision to undergo disease-related genetic testing. At most, a close relative might claim a moral
right to have the individual who is contemplating the test not act selfishly by completely disregarding the
relative's views and desires about the testing. Thus, this Article has considered all the interests of the close
relatives in evaluating the Fourth Amendment status of obtaining, storing, and trawling DNA profiles for
identification and concluded that these interests do not tip the balance. One might argue with this conclusion, but
muddled metaphors about "joint occupancy" do not advance the analysis.
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I do not doubt a database of expanded profiles of convicted offenders used for
full-match and near-miss trawls will cause anguish to family members when it
links close relatives to crimes, and if and when it exposes genetic relationships (or
their absence) not widely known within the family unit or kept as family secrets.
Moreover, scenarios can be constructed in which it might even result in a false
conviction.329 Unfortunately, that much is true of existing databases and inner-
directed trawls. A humane system of criminal justice should strive to keep these
effects to a minimum, consistent with the objective of convicting the guilty. But
foregoing the opportunity to apprehend and prosecute wrongdoers also has grave
costs. An advanced database system that includes highly accurate kinship match-
ing is a permissible legislative choice.
At the same time, not all that is permitted is desirable. Would such a system
purchase greater individual justice at the expense of comparative justice
330
(because of racially skewed databases and the bad luck that the close kin of
database inhabitants suffer through no fault of their own)? 3 3 1 Would a population-
wide database be fairer, affordable, and constitutional? Critiques of kinship
matching raise these and other significant questions. I have not even tried to
answer most of these outstanding questions of philosophy, policy, practice, and
prudence. Nevertheless, I shall be content if my discussion of the nature and
potential of near-miss searching and my responses to the constitutional objections
to "familial searching" clarify the logic and limitations of these objections.
329. See supra Part IV.C.2.
330. On these two facets of justice, see JOEL FEINBERG, SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY 98-107 (1973).
331. Cf. Daniel Statman, Introduction, in MORAL LUCK 1, 16 (Daniel Statman ed., 1993) (discussing the
paradox that whereas we normally profess that individuals are morally assessable only for matters under their
control, we frequently make moral judgments of people for things that depend on factors beyond their control).
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